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TREATMENT OF REAL PROPERTY
LIENS IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
GERALD F. MUNITZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this Article is the treatment of real property liens
in cases under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Code").
Topics discussed are (i) the concept of adequate protection, (ii)
treatment of postpetition rents as "cash collateral," (iii) the estate's
ability to obtain credit including the priming of existing liens, (iv)
the special provision of § 1111(b) pertaining to an undersecured
creditor in a chapter 11 case, and (v) the treatment of a lien on
real estate under the "cram down" power.
Bankruptcy law is said to be arcane and counter-intuitive.
Only in bankruptcy can perfected senior liens become junior liens
and a matured mortgage involuntarily restructured into a deferred
balloon payment obligation. In the hope that the bankruptcy
process and its treatment of real property liens will be better
understood, this Article will present an overview of the bankruptcy
power and the structure of the Code.
II. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
LAW IS A FEDERAL QUESTION
A. *ConstitutionalBasis
1. The Bankruptcy Power
The United States Constitution delegates to Congress the
exclusive power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of
,"1 Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust
Bankruptcies ....
Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.
("Rock Island") defined "subject of bankruptcies" as "nothing less
than 'the subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to his
* Gerald Munitz is a principal in the Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights
group of Goldberg Kohn Bell Black Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally, Charles J. Tabb, The History
of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5
(1995).
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and their relief."' 2 Rock Island relied upon In re Klein 3, which held
the bankruptcy power:
[E]xtends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the
property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its
greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts. And all
intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending
to further the great end of the subject-distribution and discharge4
are in the competency and discretion of congress.
Rock Island also held that "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" are
convertible terms. The court stated that "while attempts have
been made to formulate a distinction between bankruptcy and
insolvency, it long has been settled that, within the meaning of the
5
constitutional provision, the terms are convertible."
2. FederalSupremacy and the Contracts Clause
When Congress enacts bankruptcy legislation, that power is
"paramount and transcends and supersedes all inconsistent state
laws."6 However, FaitouteIron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,
N.J. 7 sustained a state statute permitting a municipality in a
court supervised proceeding, with the consent of eighty-five
percent of affected bondholders, to extend the maturity of the city's
unsecured bonds but prohibiting the state from reducing the
unpaid principal.8 While the grant of a discharge in bankruptcy or
its equivalent, the confirmation of a plan, have the effect of
abridging the debtor's contractual obligations, this result does not
conflict with the Constitution's "Contracts Clause" 9 because that
clause only prohibits the states from impairing obligations under
existing contracts. The restriction does not apply to Congress
because doing so would be inconsistent with Congress's
bankruptcy power to discharge obligations in existence at the date
of enactment of a bankruptcy statute.
First National Bank of Chicago v. Prima Co.10 discussed the
applicability of the bankruptcy power to both existing and future
contracts. "
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 673.
42 U.S. (1 How.) 277 (1843)
Id. at 718.
Rock Island, 294 U.S. at 667-68.

6. Chi. Junction R.R. v. Sprague (In re Chi. Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1,
4 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,
278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
7. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
8. Id. at 502, 512-14. Cf. Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., No. 0355247, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 490, at *21 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2005) (holding a

state statute was preempted by the Code).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
10. 88 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1937).
11. Id. at 788.
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All parties to a contract are, of necessity, aware of the existence of,
and subject to, the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of
bankruptcies. They were and are chargeable with knowledge that
their rights and remedies, in case the debtor becomes insolvent and
is adjudicated a bankrupt, are affected by existing bankruptcy laws
and all future lawful bankruptcy legislation which might be
enacted.

12

Another unavoidable conclusion is that all contracts are made
with the knowledge that existing bankruptcy laws may be
amended. 13 However, always to be remembered with respect to
the exercise of the bankruptcy power is that, like the other
substantive powers of Congress, it is subject to constitutional
14
restraints, such as the Fifth and Eleventh Amendments.
3. HistoricalPerspectiveand Interpretationof Bankruptcy Power
In 1898, Congress enacted a comprehensive bankruptcy
statute named the Bankruptcy Act. 15 Subsequently, the Chandler
Act Amendments of 1938 added Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII to
the Act.' 6 Recognizing the need to adapt bankruptcy law to
present financial and commercial activities, in 1970, Congress
created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to recommend changes to the substantive and procedural
law of bankruptcy. The Commission filed a two-part report in
Part Two was a draft statute which, with significant
1973.
amendments, became the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.17
In an effort to meet new conditions resulting from commercial
activity growth, the tendency of bankruptcy laws and of judicial
interpretation of those laws has been uniformly in the direction of
progressive liberalization.18 But all expansions of the bankruptcy
power were not readily accepted. A month after deciding Rock
Island, the Supreme Court struck down the first Frazier-Lemke
Act 19 as unconstitutional in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford.20 The following year the Court voided the first municipal

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XI. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54 (1996); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash.
D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997); Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 1909, 1914 (2004).
15. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
16. Chandler Act (Bankruptcy Act, Amendments of 1938) ch. 575, 52 Stat.
840 (1938) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).
17. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
18. See Rock Island, 294 U.S. at 671.
19. Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289
(1934).
20. Radford, 295 U.S. at 555.
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debt adjustment law in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Dist. No.
1.21 The constitutional infirmity in both cases was not that the
subject legislation exceeded the scope of the bankruptcy power, but
rather that the bankruptcy power had to yield to other
constitutional demands, i.e., the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Amendments, along with state sovereignty. 22 Scholars still debate
whether successor statutes sustained in Wright v. Union Central
Life Insurance Co.23 and United States v. Bekins 24 actually
corrected the perceived defects or only reflected the intervening
change in the composition of the Supreme Court.
B. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978
1. Background and Statutory Construction
The Code was developed during the period 1970-1978 and
enacted on November 6, 1978 with an effective date of October 1,
1979.25 Updated with periodic amendments, the most significant
changes came in 1984, 1986, 1994, and 2000. The cardinal canon
of statutory construction used in interpreting the Code, as with
other federal legislation, is the "plain meaning rule." Basically,
Congress "says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what is says there."26 The plain meaning rule, i.e., the words
Congress used, will control unless it produces a patently absurd
result or contravenes clear legislative history. 27
A second rule of statutory construction is the "clean slate
rule." As noted, a pervasive bankruptcy statute has been in
continuous effect for more than 100 years. Dewsnup v.Timm 28
observed:
When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write 'on a
clean slate.'. . . Furthermore, this Court has been reluctant to
accept arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the
particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some
discussion in the legislative history .... Of course, where the
language is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot
29
be controlling.
Another rule followed in construing the Code is that if
21. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 542 (1936).
22. Id.; Radford, 295 U.S. at 589.
23. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).

24. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
25. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549.
26. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); Hartford
Underwriters v. Union Planters, 530 U.S. 1, 10 (2000).
27. In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1999).
28. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
29. Id. at 419-20.
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Congress knows how to say something and chooses not to do so, its
30
silence is controlling.
2. Structure of the Code
The Code contains the following eight Arabic-numbered
chapters, with chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13 each being referred to
as a "relief' chapter:
Chapter 1
Chapter 3
Chapter 5
Chapter 7
Chapter 9
Chapter 11

General Provisions
Case Administration
Creditors, Debtor and the Estate
Liquidation
Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality
Reorganization
Adjustment of Debts of a Family
Farmer with Regular Annual Income
Adjustment of Debts of an Individual
with Regular Income

All cases may be voluntarily commenced. Cases brought31
under chapters 7 and 11 may also be involuntarily commenced.
The eligibility of an entity to be a debtor in a case is contained in
32
Code § 109(b)-(g).
Code § 103 specifies which chapters of the Code apply to the
cases. Relevant to this Article are the following applications:
this title apply in a case under chapter
(a) Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of
33
title.
this
of
13
or
7, 11, 12,
of chapter 11 of this title apply only in
(g) Subchapters I, II and 3III
4
chapter.
such
a case under
(i) Chapter
35
chapter.

13 of this title applies

only in

a case under such

(j) Chapter
36
chapter.

12 of this title applies

only in

a case under such

a chapter 9 case, the chapters and sections of the Code
applicable to the case are specified in § 103(f) and § 901. Among
the sections adopted by § 901 are §§ 364(d), 506, 552, 1111(b) and
In

30. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23
(1984); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
32. Id. § 109(b)-(g).
33. Id. § 103(a).
34. Id. § 103 (g).
35. Id. § 103 (i).
36. Id. § 103(j).
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1129(b)(1).
III. SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR REAL
ESTATE CASES AND LIENS
There is a general principle that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected. But as discussed in Matter of Penrod,37
the principle cannot be taken literally. While the secured creditor
does not, by participating in the bankruptcy case by filing a claim,
surrender his lien,3 8 the lien is subject to challenge and may be
impaired in a plan or reorganization. In Penrod,a lienholder filed
a claim but did not object to the confirmed plan's not classifying
his lien. The precise question presented was whether a preexisting lien survives a reorganization where the plan or order
confirming the plan does not mention the lien. The Seventh
Circuit ruled that the lien was extinguished relying upon § 1141(c)
which provides that "except as provided in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property
dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests
of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the
debtor." The lesson to be learned is that the lienholder must
follow the case to the point of insuring that the plan, or a sale of
property under § 363, does not extinguish the lien.
Set forth below are sections of the Code that provide special
treatment for real estate cases and liens on real property:
Code
Section
101(51)(B)

101(53)

362(b)(3)

Summary of Provision
Defines the term "single asset real estate,"
including the requirement that the debtor's
noncontingent, liquidated secured debt not exceed
$4 million. See IV.D, V.D, infra.
Defines "statutory lien" as a lien arising
solely by force of a statute on specified
circumstances or conditions, or lien of distress for
rent, whether or not statutory, but does not
include security interest or judicial lien.
Exempts from the operation of the automatic
stay of § 362(a), any act to perfect, or to maintain
or continue the perfection of, an interest in
property that is not a voidable transfer under
§§ 544, 545 and 549 or is filed within the time
periods prescribed by § 546(b) and § 547(e)(2)(A).

37. 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995).
38. In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1986); Matter of Met-L-Wood

Corp., 861 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Code
Section

362(b)(8)

362(b)(18)

363(g)

363(i)

502(b)(3)

506(d)

177

Summary of Provision
Exempts from the operation of the automatic
stay, the commencement of any action by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to
foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust in any case
in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the
Secretary is insured or was formerly insured
under the National Housing Act and covers
property, or combinations or property, consisting
of five or more living units.
Exempts from the operation of the automatic
stay, the making of an assessment for any tax and
issuance of a notice and demand for payment of
such an assessment (but any tax lien that would
otherwise attach to property of the estate by
reason of such an assessment shall not take effect
unless such tax is a debt of the debtor that will
not be discharged in the case and such property or
its proceeds are transferred out of the estate to, or
otherwise revested in, the debtor).
Exempts from the operation of the automatic
stay, the creation or perfection of a statutory lien
for an ad valorem property tax imposed by the
District of Columbia, or a political subdivision of a
State, if such tax comes due after the filing of the
petition.
Deals with relief from the automatic stay of
an act against single asset real estate.
Authorizes trustee to sell property free and
clear of any vested or contingent right in the
nature of dower or curtesy.
Recognizes right of the debtor's spouse or a
co-owner of property of the estate to purchase
property at the price at which a sale is to
consummated to a third party, i.e., creates a right
of first refusal.
Disallows a claim for a tax assessed against
property of the estate to the extent such claim
exceeds the value of the interest of the estate in
such property.
Preserves the validity of a lien where the
underlying claim was (1) disallowed only under
§§ 502(b)(5) or 502(e), or (2) such claim was not an
allowed secured claim due only to the failure of
the secured creditor to file a proof of claim under
§ 501.
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Summary of Provision

See comment to § 362(b)(3), supra.
For purposes of preference law, a transfer of
an interest in property other than fixtureo, but
including the interest of a seller or purchaser
under a contract for the sale of real property, is
547(e)(1)(A) perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such
property from the debtor against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot
acquire an interest that is superior to the interest
of the transferee.
See
comments
to
§ 362(b)(3)
and
547(e)(2)(A) § 547(e)(1)(A), supra.
The trustee may not avoid a post-petition
transfer of real property to a good faith purchaser
without knowledge of the commencement of the
case and for present fair equivalent value unless a
copy or notice of the petition was filed, where a
transfer of such real property may be recorded to
perfect such transfer, before such transfer is so
perfected that a bone fide purchaser of such
549(c)
property, against whom applicable law permits
such transfer to be perfected, could not acquire an
interest that is superior to the interest of such
good faith purchaser.
A good faith purchaser without knowledge of
the commencement of the case and for less than
present fair equivalent value has a lien on the
property transferred to the extent of any present
value given, unless a copy or notice of the petition
was so filed before such transfer was so perfected.
722
The debtor's right of redemption in a chapter
7 case does not pertain to real property.
The rights of a holder of a secured claim
secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence
may not be impaired by a chapter 11 plan. An
1123(b)(5)
individual debtor, however, may cure any default
pursuant to § 1123(a)(5)(G). Interest on interest
will only be allowed if provided for in the
agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.
See § 1123(d).
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Code
Section

1322(b)(2)

1322(b)(5)

179

Summary of Provision
The rights of a holder of a secured claim
secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence
may not be impaired by a chapter 13 plan. The
plan may, however, cure a default pursuant to
§ 1322(b)(3). Interest on interest will only be
allowed if provided for in the agreement and
applicable nonbankruptcy law. See § 1322(e).
Notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2), a plan may
provide for the curing of any default within a
reasonable time and maintenance of payments
while the case is pending on which the last
payment is due after the date on which the final
payment under the plan is due.
Notwithstanding subsection 1322(b)(2), and
applicable non-bankruptcy law (1) a default with
respect to a lien on the debtor's principal
residence may be cured under paragraph (3) or (5)
of subsection (b) until such residence is sold at a
foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance
with applicable nonbankruptcy law, and (2) in a
case in which the last payment on the original
payment schedule for a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence is due before the date
on which the final payment under the plan is due,
the plan may provide for the payment of the claim
as modified pursuant to§ 1325(a)(5).

IV. DEFINITIONS OF CLAIM, CREDITOR, LIEN, SECURITY
INTEREST, AND SINGLE ASSET REAL ESTATE

A. "Claim"Is Defined to Mean:
(a) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or
(b) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to
an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
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matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 39
B. Creditor
A "creditor" is an "entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before [the entry of] the order for relief
in the bankruptcy case concerning the debtor."40
Also to be noted is the following distinction: Assume a lender
makes an unsecured loan to a corporation, which loan is
guaranteed by the corporate president and is secured by a
mortgage on the president's home. The lender would only be an
unsecured creditor in the corporation's bankruptcy case. It would
be a secured creditor in the president's bankruptcy case because of
its mortgage on his or her home. If the guarantee was not secured
with the president's property, the lender would only be an
unsecured creditor in the president's bankruptcy case.
C. Consensual, Judicialand Statutory Liens
"Lien" is the broadest term in bankruptcy law affecting
secured creditors. A lien means a "charge against or interest in
property [of the estate] to secure payment of a debt or performance
of an obligation."41
Lien encompasses both a "judicial lien,"
security interests arising under "a security agreement," and
statutory liens. A judicial lien is one obtained by judgment, levy,
sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. 42 A
security agreement is a consensual lien, a lien created by
agreement. 43 Under bankruptcy law, a real estate mortgage is a
security interest.
The Code defines a statutory lien as a lien arising solely by
force of a statute or specified circumstances or conditions, or lien of
distress for rent, whether or not statutory. Section 545 of the Code
avoids statutory liens that are disguised priorities and conflict
with the priorities established by § 507(a) of the Code. Statutory
liens may be avoided if they are first effective upon the
commencement of a bankruptcy case or similar event stated in
§ 545(1), is not perfected or enforceable as of the commencement of
a bankruptcy case against a bona fide purchaser, whether or not
such purchaser exists, is for rent, or is a lien of distress for rent. A
statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax is not affected by
§ 545 but is subject to disallowance under § 502(b)(3) if the tax
claim exceeds the value of the interest of the estate in the
property. By way of example, if a debtor owned Blackacre having
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
Id. § 101(10).
Id. § 101(37).
Id. § 101(36)
Id. § 101(51).
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a value of $100,000 but unavoidable mortgages and judicial liens
against Blackacre totaled $125,000, the tax lien is entitled to the
status accorded it under applicable nonbankruptcy law but is not a
claim against the debtor's estate.
D. Single Asset Real Estate
In response to pressure from real property lenders, the Code
defines "single asset real estate" to mean:
real property constituting a single property or project, other than
residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which
generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor and on
which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other
than the business of operating the real property and activities
liquidated
incidental thereto having aggregate noncontingent,
44
secured debts in an amount no more than $4,000,000.
The phrase "single asset real estate" only appears in
Code § 362(d)(3) regarding relief from the automatic stay.
Pursuant to § 102(2), the phrase "claim against the debtor
includes a claim against property of the debtor", a nonrecourse
As discussed in Section VIII infra, pursuant to
claim.
§ 1111(b)(1)(A), an undersecured creditor automatically obtains
the right of recourse against a debtor retaining ownership of the
collateral with respect to the unsecured portion of its claim,
whether or not such creditor has a recourse claim under applicable
Conversely, under specified conditions,
nonbankruptcy law.
§ 1111(b)(2) permits the creditor to waive the "split" effected by
§ 1111(b)(1) and remain a secured creditor for the full amount of
its claim.
V. THE CONCEPT OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION
A. Introductionand Purpose
Among the concepts introduced by the Code was that of
"adequate protection" of the interests of secured creditors. 45 A lien
is a property right. Adequate protection is designed to reconcile
the tension between the prohibition against the taking of property
established by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
case to impair the
Constitution and the need in a bankruptcy
46
creditor.
secured
a
of
rights and remedies
44. Id. § 101(51B). See In re Kkemko, Inc. 181 B.R. 47, 48 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1995).
45. The interests of a co-owner of property of the estate and of an entity
having a right of setoff are also entitled to adequate protection. A secured
creditor's right to adequate protection in a chapter 12 case is governed by 11
U.S.C. § 1205.
46. See Wright, 311 U.S. at 278-79 (stating that the Bankruptcy Act
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While the concept of "adequate protection" is not defined in
the Code, the generally accepted definition views adequate
protection as that protection necessary to preserve the value of a
lien at the commencement of the case throughout the
administration of the case.
The most important message of the Code with respect to the
treatment of an entity with an interest in property of the estate or
in the possession of the estate is that its remedies may be
suspended, even abrogated, and its right of recourse to collateral
may be terminated as it is consumed in the business, as long as the
value of its secured position is adequately protected .... However,
courts are divided on the question of whether the value to be
protected is the value of the interest as of the date of the request for
protection or as of the commencement of the case. 47
Adequate protection is not self-executing.
The secured
creditor must establish the value of its secured claim to entitle
such value to adequate protection. The "strict rule" is that
adequate protection entitlement only arises from and after the
request for relief. 48 The 'liberal rule" is that, if otherwise timely
requested, the adequate protection entitlement can be made
retroactive to the commencement of the case. 49 The failure to
request adequate protection, however, does not affect the validity
of an otherwise perfected lien.
It is essential to note that the interest entitled to protection is
the value of the lien. A creditor holding a valid lien on collateral
worth $15,000 securing a $10,000 claim is entitled to have $10,000
in value protected against decrease, i.e., the amount required to
make the creditor whole. If collateral having a value of $8,000
secures a $10,000 claim, the creditor is only entitled to protection
of the $8,000 value (i.e., its secured claim as determined under
§ 506(a)).
B. Valuation of Collateraland § 506(a)
Section 506(a) provides for the determination of a creditor's
secured status as a function of the "value" of the creditor's interest
in the property. The level of adequate protection to which the
creditor is entitled will be based upon this valuation.
The
rehabilitates distressed debtors while safeguarding the rights of secured
creditors); Rock Island, 294 U.S. at 680-81 (declaring that Congress has
authority to pass legislation pertinent to bankruptcies even if it impairs the
obligation of private contracts).
47. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

361.01, at 361-6 (15th ed. 1991). See also

In re Beker Indus. Corp., 58 B.R. 725, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ('adequate
protection' is not defined in the Code except by the implications of the
examples..... Its application is left to the vagaries of each case.").
48. See generally In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. 967 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995).
49. See generally In re Longbine, 256 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000).
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procedure for determining the value of security is contained in
Bankruptcy Rule 3012. This Rule permits the valuation to be
made on motion of any party in interest, after notice and a
hearing, to the secured creditor and any other entity the court may
direct. 50 A final hearing conducted under Bankruptcy Rule 4001
would be a hearing in compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 3012.
Value is a factual matter, and the party appealing a valuation
finding will bear the heavy burden of showing that the trial court's
51
finding was clearly erroneous.
The difference between requesting a "plain" valuation of
collaterial under Rule 3012 and requesting relief from the
automatic stay should be noted. There is no restriction on the
number of times a creditor can request relief from the automatic
stay. There is a continuing controversy as to how many valuations
a creditor is entitled to. The "strict rule" is two, one for purposes
of adequate protection and the second, if necessary, for purposes of
plan confirmation. 52 The "liberal rule" would permit multiple
53
valuations for cause shown.
C. Commercially Reasonable Standard of Valuation
Many courts, in valuing collateral pursuant to § 506(a), have
applied the "commercially reasonable" standard of in In re
American Kitchen Foods, Inc..54
Where collateral is used or produced.., by a going business which
offers reasonable prospects that it can continue, the value of the
collateral is equatable with the net recovery realizable from its
disposition as near as may be in the ordinary course of the business.
Consistency in collateral valuation obviously does not mean that
collateral will be assigned the same value throughout the
proceedings as at their commencement, but merely that the most
in
the
practicable
reasonable disposition
commercially
circumstances should be the standard universally applicable in all
55
cases and at every phase of each case.

The last sentence of § 506(a) provides that a valuation made
for one purpose, for example in an adequate protection hearing
will not be given res judicata effect in other valuation aspects of

50. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012
51. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013.
52. See generally In re Addison Props. Ltd., 185 B.R. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1995).
53. See generally In re The Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1990).
54. Chem. Bank & First Penn. Bank, N.A. v. Am. Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re
Am. Kitchen Foods, Inc.), No. BK75-294-302ND, 1976 Bankr. LEXIS 6, at *1618 (Bankr. D. Me. June 8, 1976).
55. Id.
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the case, such as those addressing plan confirmation.
This
provision, however, is not a license for misrepresentation in
valuation hearings. A secured creditor's change in position must
be based upon intervening events or the type of appraisal (going
concern versus liquidation), and not upon the strategy of
demeaning the value of property at an adequate protection
hearing and elevating it for purposes of confirmation.
The
converse of this admonition is equally applicable to the trustee or
its equivalent, the debtor in possession, in a chapter 11 case.
D. RelationshipBetween Adequate Protection
and §§ 362(d), 363(e), and 364(d)
The right of the secured creditor to adequate protection limits
the trustee's rights under §§ 362, 363, and 364(d). The trustee will
lose the benefits of the automatic stay of an act against property of
the estate (e.g., foreclosure) provided by § 362(a) if the secured
creditor's interest in such property is not adequately protected. 56
Section 362(d) contains three grounds for relief from the
automatic stay. The first ground is for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection.57 The second ground with respect to a stay of
an act against property of the estate is that there is no equity in
the property and the property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization of the debtor.58 The third ground is tied to the
Code's definition of single asset real estate. 59 If the property is a
single asset real estate, the stay is to be modified unless not later
than ninety days after the order for relief, or such additional time
as extended by the court, the debtor has filed a plan of
reorganization that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed
within a reasonable period of time."60 Alternatively, the stay will
be modified unless the debtor has commenced monthly payments
on a consensual lien in an "amount equal to interest at a current
fair market rate on the creditor's secured claim." 61
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3), an order granting a
motion for relief form the automatic stay made in accordance with
Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(1) is stayed until the expiration of ten
days after the entry of the order, unless the Court orders
otherwise. Conversely, ex parte relief from the stay granted under
§ 362(f) and Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(2) is not subject to the ten
day stay.
Section 363(e) conditions the trustee's right to continue to

56. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

57. Id. § 362(d)(1).
58. Id. § 362(d)(2)(A).

59. Id. § 362(d)(3).
60. Id. § 362 (d)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 362 (d)(3)(B).
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use, sell, or lease property, including cash collateral, upon
adequate protection existing for the secured creditor's interest in
such property. Finally, the extraordinary power of the trustee
under § 364(d) to obtain credit secured by the grant of a senior or
equal lien on encumbered property is subject to the primed lien
being adequately protected. 62 Although the Code does not suggest
a different standard, some courts have suggested that adequate
protection must be more strictly construed for purposes of § 363 or
§ 364 than for purposes of § 362.63
E. Entitlement to Adequate Protection: Equity Cushion
Adequate protection payments or additional liens need be
furnished only to the extent that the value of the collateral
decreases during the administration of a bankruptcy case to the
point that the value of the lien is jeopardized. If at all times the
value of the collateral exceeds the lien, the "equity cushion"
64
eliminates the need for adequate protection.
In determining the adequacy of an equity cushion, the courts
have looked to the stability of the collateral, the likelihood of
reorganization, and the credibility of the trustee's proposal for
furnishing adequate protection. 65 A cushion of twenty percent or
of less than
more is usually considered adequate, while a cushion
66
eleven percent is usually considered inadequate.
When adequate protection is required under §§ 362, 363, or
364, § 361 specifies three methods of furnishing such protection.
They are cash payments, additional or replacement liens, and
indubitable equivalents.
The most definitive method of providing adequate protection
to a secured creditor is requiring the trustee to make lump sum or
periodic cash payments to such creditor. 67 While there may be a
dispute with respect to the amount of the payment required, there
cannot be an issue with respect to a dollar being a dollar. 66 The

62. Id. § 364(d)(1)(B).
63. See In re Chevy Devco, 78 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating
adequate protection in relief from stay proceedings merely preserves the
status quo, whereas under 364 it must protect the creditor against harm
caused by the imposition of a senior lien); In re O.P. Held, Inc., 74 B.R. 777,
782 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (what may constitute protection for purposes of
denying a motion to lift the stay is not necessarily adequate to authorize the
debtor's use of cash collateral).
64. See generally In re Am. Kitchen Foods, 1976 Bankr. LEXIS at *16-18; In
re Chauncey St. Assocs. L.P., 107 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
65. See, e.g., In re Phila. Consumer Disc. Co., 37 B.R. 946, 949 n.9 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1984).
66. See Kost v. First Interstate Bank of Greybull (In re Kost), 102 B.R. 829,
831-32 (Bankr. D. Wy. 1989).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1).
68. See, e.g., Bargas v. Rice (In re Rice), 82 B.R. 623, 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
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second method of providing adequate protection is granting the
secured creditor an additional or replacement lien to the extent
that the "stay, use, sale, lease or grant results in a decrease in the
value" of the creditor's interest in its collateral. 69 The additional
or replacement lien method of adequate protection is less certain
than cash payments because of the potential for controversy over
the value of the newly pledged collateral.70 The third method of
furnishing adequate protection is to give the creditor the
"indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the collateral.7 1
Satisfaction of the "indubitable equivalent" catchall of § 361(3)
requires strict proof that the protection is "indubitable."72While a
guaranty may constitute adequate protection under § 361(3), the
cases generally require that the guaranty be adequately secured.7 3
Absent the secured creditor's consent, the granting of an
administrative expense claim cannot constitute adequate
protection.74
Congress properly concluded that the protection
provided by an administrative priority claim is "too uncertain to be
75
meaningful."
F. PostpetitionEffect of PrepetitionSecurity Interest
Section 552(a) sets forth the general rule that "property
acquired by the estate or the debtor after the commencement of
the bankruptcy case is not subject to any lien" resulting from a
prepetition security agreement. A significant exception to the
general rule contained in § 552(b) is that if the prepetition security
interest covers "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" of the
prepetition collateral, then the security interest extends to the
described items "acquired by the estate post petition to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable
nonbankruptcy law." The amount of this entitlement, however, is
subject to assessment as determined by the court based on the

1987); Greives v. Bank of W. Ind. (In re Greives), 81 B.R. 912, 962-63 (Bankr.

N.D. Ind. 1987).
69.

11 U.S.C. § 361(2).

70. See, e.g., In re Dynaco Corp., 162 B.R. 389, 397-98 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1993).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3).
72. Southtrust Mobile Serv., Inc. v. Englebert, 137 B.R. 975, 983-84 (N.D.
Ala. 1992) ("[A]dequate protection requires that the secured party be
guaranteed that it timely realize the indubitable equivalent of its interest,
meaning the whole value of its bargained-for rights."(internal quotations
omitted)). See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Fuels, Inc., 121 B.R. 207, 210 (Bankr.
S.D. W. Va. 1990).
73. See In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. 192, 194-95 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(holding a secured guaranty to be sufficient based upon stable substantial
collateral value).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3).
75. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, 49, 53-54 (1978).
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equities of the case, e.g., the amount that the estate contributed to
This assessment power is the
the creation of the proceeds.
postpetition counterpart to the prepetition improvement in
position test contained in § 547(c)(5). It also does not detract from
the trustee's power under § 506(c) to assess the collateral for the
reasonable and necessary costs of preserving, or disposing of, the
collateral.
Section 552(b)(2) expressly extends the scope of a prepetition
mortgage to amounts paid postpetition as rents derived from the
liened property or the "fees, charges, accounts, or other payments
for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in
Here also, the
hotels, motels, or other lodging properties."
postpetition entitlement is subject to assessment based on the
76
equities of the case.
G. Right of Secured Creditors to Postpetition
Interest and Reimbursement of Its Fees
Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this
section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be
allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement
under which such claim arose.
This provision entitles an oversecured creditor, whether
holding a consensual, judicial, or statutory lien, to postpetition
interest and reimbursement of its reasonable fees, costs, or
charges as provided in its contract with the debtor or applicable
nonbankruptcy law. 77 United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. 78 held that an
oversecured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest only "to the
extent" that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its
claim.79

Even more important for our purposes than § 506's use of
terminology is its substantive effect of denying undersecured
creditors postpetition interest on their claims-just as it denies
oversecured creditors postpetition interest to the extent that such
interest, when added to the principal amount of the claim, will

76. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
77. Id. § 506(b); In re Lane, 108 B.R. 6, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). See also
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242-49 (stating oversecured claims based on
either consensual or nonconsensual liens are entitled to postpetition interest).
See also In re Charter Co., 63 B.R. 568, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1986).
78. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
79. Id. at 372.
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80
exceed the value of the collateral.

It is important to note the Code's requirement that costs
assessed against the collateral under Code § 506(c) are to be
deducted in determining the existence of an oversecured position81
In Timbers, the Supreme Court rejected an undersecured
creditor's argument that adequate protection should compensate it
for its "lost opportunity costs," i.e., the amount it could have
received and reinvested had the automatic stay not enjoined its
82
foreclosing on the collateral.
H.

The Superpriorityof§ 507(b)

If the adequate protection accorded a secured creditor proves
inadequate, § 507(b) grants the secured creditor an administrative
claim for its damages with priority over every other priority claim
allowable under § 507(a).8 3 Although the rationale for and the
language of § 507(b) could support the opposite result,
administrative claims incurred under § 503(b) in a superseding
chapter 7 case have priority over a § 507(b) "inadequate protection
84
claim" incurred in a chapter 11 case.
The protection afforded by the § 507(b) priority is effective
only to the extent that the estate has unencumbered assets
sufficient to meet the adequate protection deficiency. Moreover,
the priority may be preempted if credit is extended to the estate
under § 364(c)(1).8 5 To protect its interests, the secured creditor
should obtain an order directing that notice of all proceedings be
served upon it, so that it may monitor the conduct of the case and
oppose the granting of § 364(c)(1) status for improvident
extensions of credit.
VI. CASH COLLATERAL
A.

Definition of Cash Collateral

Section 363(a) defines "cash collateral" as:
cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit
accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the

80. Id.
81. See also Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Delta Res., Inc. (In re Delta Res.,
Inc.), 54 F.3d 722, 729-30 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that there is no entitlement
to a constant equity cushion).
82. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 378.
83. Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Rife, 876 F.2d 361, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1989). But
see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir. 1994)
(requiring benefit to the estate for superpriority claim to be allowed).
84. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 726(b). See also Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v.
Nordyke (In re Nordyke), 43 B.R. 856, 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b).
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estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest and
includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of
property and the fees, charges, accounts or other payments for the
use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels,
motels, or other lodging properties subject to a security interest as
provided in section 552(b) of this title, whether existing before or
after the commencement of a case under this title.

The last clause of the definition and the legislative history
accompanying Code § 363(a) clearly make the definition applicable
to cash collateral existing on the petition date and to cash
collateral generated postpetition as the result of a disposition or
realization of property in which the estate and another entity have
an interest.8 6 Rents in the possession of the debtor at the
commencement of the case or subsequently acquired are cash
collateral subject to the provisions of § 363(c). Unless the trustee
is permitted to use cash collateral pursuant to Code § 363(c)(2),
any cash
the trustee is required to "segregate and account for
87
control.
or
custody,
possession,
collateral" in his or her
B.

Use of Cash Collateral.

In voluntary cases, the trustee or debtor in possession is
prohibited from using, selling, or leasing cash collateral, whenever
88
generated, unless each entity having an interest therein consents
or the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale,
or lease8 9 . Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(b) requires
that a request to use cash collateral be made by motion in
accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014.90
Until an order for relief is entered in an involuntarily
commenced case, Code § 303(o authorizes the alleged debtor to

86. See S. REP. No. 95-989.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(4). See also In re Cerrico Realty Corp., 127 B.R. 319,
325 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the debtor in possession is required
to segregate cash collateral even while a hearing is pending to determine the
relative rights of the debtor in possession and its secured creditor in the cash
collateral).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A).
89. Id. § 363(c)(2)(B). See also Armstrong v. Norwest Bank, Minn., N.A.,
964 F.2d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding neither notice nor a hearing is
required for the debtor to use cash collateral in the ordinary course of business
if each entity that has an interest in such collateral consents to its use); In re
Nemko, Inc., 143 B.R. 980, 988-89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) ('"Where a primary
secured creditor consents to the use of cash collateral but a secondary secured
creditor objects, a debtor may only use the collateral by an order of the
court.").
90. See Cerrico Realty, 127 B.R. at 324 (holding although mortgagee
consented prepetition to the debtor's use of assigned rents by contractually
waiving its right to collect the rents, the rents upon the commencement of the
case constituted cash collateral and the debtor was required to obtain
postpetition consent from the creditor or a court order before using them).
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continue to use its property "notwithstanding § 363 ... except to
the extent that the court orders otherwise." Therefore, the burden
of preventing or conditioning the use of cash collateral during the
"gap" period, the time between the filing of the involuntary
case
and the entry of an order for relief, rests upon the non-debtor
entity asserting an interest in the cash collateral. While loan
agreements customarily relieve a lender of the obligation to fund
additional loans upon the filing of an involuntary petition, a
provision preventing the use of cash collateral upon the filing of
such a petition appears unenforceable under Code § 303(o.
1. Motion for Authority to Use Cash Collateral
A motion for authority to use cash collateral should include:
(a) the amount of cash collateral to be used;
(b) the name and address of each entity having an interest in the
cash collateral;
(c) the name and address of any entity having control over the cash
collateral;
(d) facts showing the need to use the cash collateral; and
(e) the nature of any adequate protection to be provided.
If interim use of cash collateral is sought pending a final
hearing, the motion must include the amount of cash collateral to
be used during the interim period pending a final hearing. 91
A hearing on a request to use cash collateral may be a
preliminary hearing or may be consolidated with a final hearing.
If a preliminary hearing, the court may authorize the requested
use, sale, or lease of cash collateral only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the DIP will prevail at the final hearing. 92
The hearing is to be scheduled in accordance with the debtor's
needs, and the court shall act promptly on any request for authority to use cash collateral. 93 Nevertheless, the court may not
commence a final hearing on a motion for authority to use cash
collateral earlier than fifteen days after service of the motion on
each entity with an interest in the cash collateral, on any
committee appointed pursuant to Code § 705 or § 1102. If no
committee is appointed, the service of the motion on the twenty
largest unsecured creditors, and on such other entities as the court
may direct is required. 94 If requested, the court may conduct a
91. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001 (advisory
Amendments).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(3).
93. Id.
94. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(b)(1)-(2).

committee's

notes to

1987
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preliminary hearing before the fifteen-day period expires, but may
authorize the use of only that amount of cash collateral necessary
to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending the
final hearing. 95 Additionally, the notice must properly 96describe
the terms and protections regarding use of cash collateral.
2. Approval of Agreements for the Use of Cash Collateral
The procedure for obtaining court approval of an agreement
prohibiting or conditioning the use of cash collateral is governed by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(d). A motion for
approval, accompanied by a copy of the agreement, is to be served
on any committee or, if no committee has been appointed, on the
twenty largest creditors and on such other entities as the court
may direct. Unless the court fixes a different time, objections may
97
If no
be filed within fifteen days of the mailing of notice.
objection is filed, the court may enter an order approving or
disapproving the agreement without a hearing.
If an objection is filed or the court determines that a hearing
is appropriate, the court will conduct a hearing on not less than
five days notice to the objector, the movant, any committee or, if no
committee has been appointed, the twenty largest creditors, and
98
Alternatively, the
such other entities as the court may direct.
the use of cash
to
relating
agreement
an
approve
may
court
collateral if it determines that sufficient notice and an opportunity
for a hearing was given pursuant to a related motion (i.e., in a
99
motion requesting authority to use cash collateral).
3. Motion to Prohibitor Condition Continued Use of Cash
Collateral
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(1) requires
that a motion under Code § 363(e) to prohibit or condition the use,
sale or lease of cash collateral as is necessary to insure adequate
protection pursuant to Code § 363(e) be served on the debtor, any
95. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(b)(2).
96. See, e.g., In re Tek-Aids Indus., Inc., 145 B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992) (stating that because the notice stated that the bank only was seeking a
security interest in the debtor's postpetition accounts receivable and
inventory, the order entered by the court was void for lack of due process to
the extent it granted the bank a security interest in the debtor's postpetition,
"equipment and other personal property (including general intangibles")).
97. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d)(2).
98. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d)(3).
99. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d)(4). See also In re Manchester Ctr., Ltd., 123
B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding failure to provide notice of a
stipulation entered into in connection with a motion for relief from the
automatic stay and a motion to prohibit the continued use of cash collateral
did not violate a creditor's right to due process where the creditor had actual
knowledge of the underlying motions).
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committee appointed pursuant to Code § 705 or § 1102 or, if no
committee is appointed, the twenty largest unsecured creditors of
the debtor, and such other entities as the court may direct.100
Ex parte relief from an order authorizing the use of cash
collateral may be obtained pursuant to Code § 363(e) and Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(2). Such relief may only be
granted if: (a) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by
affidavit or by a verified motion that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse
party or the attorney for the adverse party can be heard in
opposition; and (b) the movant's attorney certifies to the court in
writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice
and the reasons why, notice should not be required.101
4. Real PropertyRents as Cash Collateral
Under Code § 552(b), an inchoate interest in rents
automatically becomes cash collateral upon the commencement of
the case. A much debated issue prior to 1994 was whether
revenues earned from the use and occupancy of rooms and other
public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties
constituted rents for purposes of cash collateral law.
The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 ended that debate by amending
Code § 363 to provide that such revenues are rents.10 2 It is
important to recognize that the 1994 Reform Act resolved the
debate only as to revenues earned from the use or occupancy of
rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, and other
lodging properties. A number of similar debates continue to
10 3
exist.

100. See In re 499 W. Warren St. Assocs., L.P., 142 B.R. 53, 56 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that creditor's interest in real property was
adequately protected where a part of the rent which constituted cash collateral
was applied to the property's operation and maintenance since the application
contributed to the generation of additional rents upon which the creditor's
security interest subsequently attached); In re Salem Plaza Assocs., 135 B.R.
753, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that the debtor's use of rent
receipts, which constituted cash collateral for necessary operating expenses
did not diminish the value of the bank's interest in future rents but instead
preserved the base that generated the future rents). Cf. In re Delta Res. Inc.,
54 F.3d at 730 (holding that an oversecured creditor is not entitled to
postpetition interest payments during pendency of case as part of adequate
protection payments).
101. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(2)(A)(B).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (b)(2).
103. See In re GGVXX, Ltd., 130 B.R. 322, 326 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)
(declaring that greens fees and similar use fees from the DIP's golf course did
not constitute rents or, consequently, cash collateral, because the creditor only
had a lien on the DIP's real property, not its business or the revenues earned
by the business; however, revenue earned from renting the golf course to a
separate entity, which operated a golf school on the property, was cash
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5. Burden of Proof, Sanctions for Unauthorized Use of Cash
Collateral,and the Inapplicabilityof FederalRule of Bankruptcy
Procedure6004(g) to Use of Cash Collateral Orders
In any hearing regarding the use of cash collateral, the DIP
has the burden of proving that the secured creditor is adequately
the burden of
protected. 0 4 The secured creditor, however, has
10 5
lien.
its
of
extent
or
priority,
proving the validity,
The unauthorized use of cash collateral has been held to be
counsel. 0 6
contempt of court on the part of both the debtor and its
Moreover, a violation of Code § 363 may render the secured
10 7
creditor's claim against an individual debtor nondischargeable.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004(g) stays the
execution of orders authorizing the use, sale or lease of property,
other than cash collateral, until the expiration of ten days after
their entry unless the court orders otherwise. Accordingly, an
order authorizing the use of cash collateral is enforceable upon
entry unless stayed pending appeal pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
8005.
6. Appealability of Orders Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral
In the absence of a stay pending appeal, the reversal
modification on appeal of an order authorizing the purchase
lease of estate property does not affect the validity of the sale
lease if the entity that purchased or leased the property acted

or
or
or
in

collateral because it was derived from the DIP's ownership of real property).
See also Wattson Pac. Ventures v. Safeguard Self-Storage Trust (In re
Safeguard Self-Storage Trust), 2 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 1993) (revenues from
leasing storage space are rents); In re Everett Home Town L.P., 146 B.R. 453,
458 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (payments by club members were "proceeds" of the
membership agreements in which the creditor held a security interest); In re
McCann, 140 B.R. 926, 930-31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (greens fees, restaurant
and bar revenues, and sales of goods are services and not rent); In re
Northport Marina Assocs., 136 B.R. 911, 916, 921 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(revenues from boat slips were rents where boat owners contracted for a
specific assigned slip for a six-month period but were not rents where boat
owners contracted for one- to two-day periods or where boat owners received a
general storage right rather than the right to occupy a specific space); In re
Ashford Apartments L.P., 132 B.R. 217, 218 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (amounts
earned from the licensing of parking garage space constituted rents).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 363(o)(1). See also In re KNM Roswell L.P., 126 B.R. 548,
557 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1991); In re Constable Plaza Assocs., L.P., 125 B.R. 98,
104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 363(o)(2).
106. In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 523. But cf. In re Henson, 135 B.R. 346 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1991) (stating that the use of cash collateral did not render debt
nondischargeable since debtor relied on advice of counsel and used cash
collateral for the preservation and benefit of the collateral).
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good faith.10
Where Code § 363(m) applies, the appeal will be
dismissed as moot. However, because Code §363(m) does not refer
to the use of estate property, an appeal from an order authorizing
the use of cash collateral is permissible whether or not the
appellant has sought a stay pending appeal.' 0 9 Even if the use of
cash collateral order were reversed, however, pre-reversal
transactions entered into in good faith would not be affected.1 0
VII. OBTAINING CREDIT
A. Introductionto Code § 364
Code § 364 governs obtaining credit and incurring debt by the
debtor's estate. Code § 364 applies only to postpetition extensions
of new credit.'
It would appear that the provisions of Code § 364
are not available to an alleged debtor or trustee operating the
debtor's business during the involuntary gap period, i.e. the period
between the filing of an involuntary petition and the entry of an
order for relief.112 This result follows from § 364 (a) permitting
credit to be obtained only by a trustee operating a debtor's
business under specified sections of the Bankruptcy Code, e.g.,
§§ 721 and 1108.113
Code § 364 distinguishes among (i) obtaining unsecured credit
in the ordinary course of business, (ii) obtaining unsecured credit
out of the ordinary course of business, (iii) obtaining credit with
specialized priority, and (iv) obtaining credit through the grant of
senior or equal liens on property of the estate. 114

108. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).
109. In re Tek-Aids, 145 B.R. at 259 n.6.
110 Rule 6004(g) does not apply to orders regarding the use of cash
collateral and does not affect the trustee's right to use, sell, or lease property
without a court order to the extent permitted under § 363 of the Code.
111. See In re 360 Inns, Ltd., 76 B.R. 573, 578 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)
(explaining that cash collateral creditor cannot use Code § 364(c)(3) to elevate
its claim to administrative superpriority); In re FCX Inc., 54 B.R. 833, 841
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) ("Section 364(c)(1) authorizes a super priority for
postpetition loans; it does not authorize giving a super priority for prepetition
loans.").
112. See In re Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture, 73 B.R. 521, 526-27 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a).
114. See generally R. McCullough, Analysis of Code Section 364(d): When
Will a Court Allow a Trustee to Obtain PostpetitionFinancing by Granting a
Superpriority Lien?, 93 COMM. L.J. 186 (1988); Nicholas B. Telesca, Recent
Developments, Section 364(d) SuperpriorityFinancing:Has a Secured Creditor
Met His Match?, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 109 (1988).
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B. The Four Methods of ObtainingCredit
1. Code § 364(a)--ObtainingCredit in the Ordinary Course of
Business
If the debtor's business is authorized to be operated, the
trustee may obtain unsecured credit and incur unsecured debt in
the ordinary course of business, unless the court orders
otherwise. 115 To induce creditors to extend postpetition credit
under Code § 364(a), such credit is allowable as an expense of
116
The postpetition lender
administration under Code § 503(b)(1).
expenses, fees, and
requested
the
that
proving
of
has the burden
postpetition credit
of
extension
the
with
associated
charges
related
117
does not require
§
364(a)
Code
Although
were reasonable.
[sic] ability
estates
the
limit
may
court
"[t]he
notice and a hearing,
18
to incur debt under this subsection."'
2. Code § 364(b)-ObtainingCredit out of the Ordinary Course of
Business.
Unsecured credit and unsecured debt incurred other than in
the ordinary course of business may be obtained only with court
119
The Code, however, does
approval after notice and a hearing.
not define the phrase "ordinary course of business." The courts
a transaction is in
have applied two tests to determine whether
120
business.
debtor's
a
of
the ordinary course
The first test, called the "horizontal dimension test,"

115. See Romley v. Sun Nat'l Bank (In re Two "S" Corp.), 875 F.2d 240, 243
n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The authority to continue business includes the right to
incur unsecured debts for ordinary operating expenses."); In re Regensteiner
Printing Co., 122 B.R. 323, 326 (N.D. Ill.1990) (unsecured credit obtained
under Code § 364(a) or § 364(b) must relate to allowable administrative
expenses such as the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate). See also Credit Alliance Corp. v. Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc. (In re
Blumer), 95 B.R. 143, 147 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988); Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v.
SMB Holdings, Inc. (In re SMB Holdings, Inc.), 77 B.R. 29, 32 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1987).
116. See Peninsula Nat'l Bank v. Allen Carpet Shops, Inc. (In re Allen
Carpet Shops, Inc.), 27 B.R. 354, 358 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that the
clear intent of Code § 364(a) is to allow the trustee or DIP to use the
administrative priority of Code § 507(a)(1) as an inducement to entities to
open lines of credit to the debtor for purposes of reorganization). See also In re
Blumer, 66 B.R. at 114.
117. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 131 B.R. 24, 29-30 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1991) (holding the lender failed to meet this burden).
118. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 57-58 (1978).
119. See In re Massetti, 95 B.R. 360, 362 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
120. See In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 952-53 (3d Cir. 1992); Burlington
N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 70405 (9th Cir. 1988).
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compares the debtor's business to other like businesses. 121 The
test is whether the transaction in question is similar to those in
which comparable businesses engage in their day-to-day
operations. 122 The second test is the "vertical dimension, or
creditor's expectation, test."123 This test analyzes the transaction
"from the vantage point of a hypothetical creditor [of the debtor]
and inquires whether the transaction subjects a creditor to
economic risks of a nature different from those he accepted when
he decided to extend credit." 124 In other words, is the transaction
similar to those in which the debtor engaged prepetition? 125 These
two tests are designed "to assure that neither the debtor nor the
creditor do anything abnormal to gain an advantage over other
creditors ...."126
Absent an extensive prepetition course of dealing between the
DIP and the creditor, the borrowing of money is customarily
outside the ordinary course of business.127 If a transaction is not
clearly in the ordinary course of the debtor's business, a creditor
should obtain a court order after proper notice and a hearing
before providing credit to eliminate the possible adverse effect of
later challenges that the extension of credit was inappropriate.
As in the case of credit or debt incurred under Code § 364(a),
credit or debt incurred under Code § 364(b) is allowable as an
expense
of
administration
under
Code § 503(b)(1).
Code § 503(b)(1) provides that only the "actual necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate" are allowable as administrative
expenses.128 Accordingly, credit extended under Code § 364(b)
121. Roth, 975 F.2d at 952.
122. Id. at 953; Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 704. But see Martino v. First
Nat'l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 428-30
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (rejecting the horizontal dimension test as
"unnecessary").
123. Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 705.
124. Roth, 975 F.2d at 953; Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 705 (quoting Comm.
of Asbestos-Related Litigants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 60 B.R. 612, 616 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
125. See also In re C.E.N., Inc., 86 B.R. 303, 305-06 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988); In
re Cascade Oil Co., 51 B.R. 877, 882 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985) ("The 'ordinary
course of business' generally refers to day-to-day business affairs.").
126. Campbell v. Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co.), 37 B.R. 914, 922
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1983).
127. In re Avorn Dress Co., 78 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Standard
Oil & Exploration of Del., Inc., 136 B.R. 141, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992)
(explaining that the issuance of administrative priority notes which were
convertible into stock of the reorganized debtor was outside the ordinary
course of business); In re SMB Holdings, 77 B.R. at 32 (the over-drafting of
debtor's bank account was not in ordinary course of business); In re Lockwood
Enters., Inc., 52 B.R. 871, 874 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (a lender's advance of
funds to the debtor for payroll and operating expenses was not in the ordinary
course of business).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
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129
should be supported by such a finding.

3. Code § 364(c)--ObtainingCredit with Specialized Priorityor
with Liens Junior to Existing Liens
Code § 364(c) provides that, if the trustee cannot obtain
unsecured credit based upon such credit being accorded
administrative status under Code § 503(b)(1):
The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of
credit or incurring of debt (1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind
specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise
subject to a lien; or
(3)

by a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject
secured
130

to a lien.

The listing of incentives that a bankruptcy court may
authorize under Code § 364 is not exhaustive. For example, the
court may authorize contingent fee enhancements for a lender that
extends the maturity date of postpetition financing where the
3
extension benefits the estate.' '
Authorization of credit under one subsection of Code § 364
does not implicitly authorize credit under another subsection. For
example, a lender that was granted a security interest for
postpetition credit extended to the debtor was not implicitly
§§ 364(a),
entitled to administrative expense status under Code
132
(b), or (c)(1) for the undersecured portion of the loan.
a. Code § 364(c)(1)-Priority over Claims Under Code § 503(b) or
§ 507(b)
Credit extended under the authority of Code § 364(c)(1) is
superior to the claims arising in favor of a creditor entitled to
adequate protection, but whose protection proves to be inadequate.
This is accomplished by the express priority granted by
Code § 364(c)(1) over any administrative expense specified in
Code §§ 503(b) or 507(b), the last sentence of which latter section
provides priority for claims arising from "inadequate" protection
being afforded a creditor. A Code § 364(c)(1) claim also takes
129. Mark IV Props., Inc. v. Club Dev. & Mgmt. Corp. (In re Club Dev. &
Mgmt. Corp.), 27 B.R. 610, 611-12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982); In re Patch Graphics,
58 B.R. 743, 745-46 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1)-(3).
131. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Defender Drug Stores, Inc. (In re Defender
Drug Stores, Inc.), 145 B.R. 312, 316-17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992).
132. Mulligan v. Sobiech, 131 B.R. 917, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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priority over fees incurred by counsel and other professionals
retained by the DIP or creditors' committee, unless the fees were
(a) necessary to preserve or dispose of the collateral and were
incurred primarily for the benefit of the secured creditor, or (b) the
secured creditor expressly or impliedly consented to assuming the
costs of the professional services rendered. 133 The breadth of the
Code § 364(c)(1) priority had led to court-ordered carve outs of
amounts for the payment of the fees of counsel and other
professionals retained by the DIP and the creditors' committee.13 4
Code § 364(c)-Burden of Proof
As a condition to invoking Code § 364(c), the DIP must
introduce competent evidence demonstrating its inability to obtain
credit under subsections (a) or (b) of Code § 364.135 The court in In
re Crouse Group, Inc.,136 imposed upon the DIPs the burden of
proving that (a) they could not obtain credit absent the grant of
the specialized priority or security permitted by Code § 364(c);137
(b) the proposed Code § 364(c) loan transaction was necessary to
preserve the estate's assets; 138 and (c) the terms of the proposed
credit agreement were fair, reasonable, and adequate. 139 The
court declined to approve a Code § 364(c) loan where the DIPs did
not demonstrate that they made "exhaustive unsuccessful efforts
to obtain credit on terms in accordance with 364(b)."140 In Crouse,
the DIPs had approached only one lender, and had not approached
their prepetition lenders.14 '
b.

Code § 364(c)-Cross-Collateralization and In re Saybrook
Cross-collateralization in the context of a bankruptcy case is
the practice of (a) granting a postpetition lender a lien on
prepetition assets which secures the postpetition debt; or
c.

133. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Pullman Constr.
Indus., Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 941 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Mobile Air Drilling
Co., Inc., 53 B.R. 605, 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Am. Res. Mgmt.
Corp., 51 B.R. 713, 720-21 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
134. In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
135. Id. at 37.
136. 71 B.R. 544 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 550.
141. Id. at 550-51. See also Norris Square Civic Ass'n. v. St. Mary Hosp.(In
re St. Mary Hospital), 86 B.R. 393, 401 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (denying
financing by DIP's parent company where parent company completely
dominated DIP and had manufactured funding crisis).
But cf. Bray v.
Shenandoah Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Snowshoe Co.), 789 F.2d 1085, 1088
(4th Cir. 1986) (DIP need not show it sought credit from every possible lender).
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(b) granting a prepetition lender a lien on assets first arising
142
postpetition to secure prepetition debt owed to the lender.
While the first practice is the essence of a Code § 364(c)(2) or (3)
loan, the validity of the second practice, referred to as "Texloncross"backward"
or
cross-collateralization,
type"
143
in
debate
of
substantial
the
subject
has been
collateralization,
1
4
journals.
scholarly
the
and
courts
both the
The debate was ended temporarily by In re Saybrook
Manufacturing. Co.14 5 In considering whether backward crosscollateralization is "authorized" under Code § 364, the Saybrook
court noted that no provision of the Code expressly authorizes
In the absence of clear statutory
cross-collateralization. 146
direction, the court considered whether the bankruptcy court could
a
employ its equitable powers to approve cross-collateralization as147
Code.
the
of
provisions
and
policies
the
implementing
of
means
The court weighed the secured creditor's argument that
cross-collateralization furthers the policy of rehabilitation of
debtors by inducing lenders to provide financing to DIPs against
the unsecured creditors' argument that cross-collateralization
violates the policy of ensuring equitable distribution of assets
among similarly situated creditors. 148 Reasoning that the Code's
"primary purpose" of fostering rehabilitation does not justify
means that are directly contrary to the Code's equality principle
and priority scheme, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that crosscollateralization is beyond the scope of the bankruptcy court's
inherent equitable powers. 49 Unfortunately, recent cases have
revived "backward" cross-collateralization in chapter 11 cases on
the theory that the goal of reorganization trumps the principle of
equality of distribution.
4. Code § 364(d)-The ExtraordinaryPower to Obtain Credit
Secured by a Senior or Equal Lien on Property of the Estate Subject
to a Valid Lien
Code § 364(d)(1) provides that:
The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of
credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on
property of the estate that is subject to a [valid] lien only if:

142. Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d
1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1979).
143. Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg Co.), 963 F.2d 1490,
1492 (11th Cir. 1992).

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1493.
1494-95.
1495.
1495-96.
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(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the
lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien
is proposed to be granted.

In In re Aqua Associates,150 the court held that senior liens
will not be approved merely because credit is not available
elsewhere. 151 The proposed loan must be of significant benefit to
the estate and not of primary benefit to another party. 152 Also, the
DIP must show that it has exhausted the possibility of obtaining
alternative sources of credit. 153 The court must then make a
qualitative assessment of the proposed loan in light of any possible
54
alternative sources of credit before approving the senior liens. 1
Under the prior Bankruptcy Act, a trustee could issue
certificates of indebtedness with seniority over existing liens to
secure loans for operating expenses only if he established a high
degree of likelihood of a successful reorganization within a
reasonable time. 55 A less stringent test was developed in In re
156
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.,
under which, at
the outset of a case, it would be sufficient to show that
reorganization is not clearly impossible. 157 The Collier treatise
states that "[t]he requirement of adequate protection is a
substitute for the more detailed findings that were required in
cases such as In re Third Avenue."'158 In order to obtain authority
for a Code § 364(d) loan, the trustee will have to convince the court
that sufficient value remains in the property to satisfy the interest
15 9
of the "primed" lender.
150. 123 B.R. 192 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
151. Id. at 198-99.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 199.
154. Id. See In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 630-31 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that a debtor need not seek alternate financing from
every possible lender to satisfy burden of proving that it is unable to obtain
financing without priming a senior lien and, in determining whether a senior
lien is adequately protected, the court must consider whether the value of the
debtor's property will increase as a result of the renovation to be funded by the
proposed financing). See also In re Olsen, 87 B.R. 148, 150 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1988).
155. In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1952).
156. 545 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1976).
157. Id. at 1090.
158. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

364.05, at 364-13 (15th ed. 1994).

159. See In re Swedeland, 16 F.3d at 566-67 (holding projected enhancement
in value of collateral from continued development of collateral is not sufficient
adequate protection). Compare In re Timber Prods., Inc., 125 B.R. 433, 440
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (credit pursuant to Code § 364(d) denied where debtor
failed to show existing lienholder would be adequately protected; given
debtor's unrealistic financial projections, equity cushion was insufficient), with
In re Sky Valley, Inc., 100 B.R. 107, 114 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (equity
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The burden of proof regarding the issue of adequate
protection is expressly placed upon the trustee. 160 Because "super
priority financing [under Code § 364(d)] displaces liens on which
creditors have relied in extending credit," the courts must be
"particularly cautious" in determining whether the trustee has
161
met his burden of proving adequate protection.
7
In In re Snowshoe Co., the court authorized a chapter 162
trustee to incur up to $2,000,000 in debt secured by a senior lien
where the evidence demonstrated that (a) the trustee had
contacted other financial institutions in the immediate
geographical area and was unsuccessful, and (b) the objecting
bank's lien was adequately protected by an equity cushion and the
debtor's projected ability to repay the loan within one year was
financial
disinterested
by
a
well-reasoned,
supported
analysis.163Conversely, in In re Plabell Rubber Products, Inc., 164
the court denied the debtor's motion to obtain credit secured by a
senior lien because the court did not believe that the debtor had
established that it otherwise was unable to obtain credit. 165
In valuing the estate's property where a reorganization was
reasonably likely, the bankruptcy court could use going concern
values to determine adequate protection and thereby justify
additional loans to the DIP. Where a reorganization was not
reasonably likely, the court should use liquidation values. In
making the going concern or liquidation determination, the court
166
may consider the quality of current management.
An application under Code § 364(b), (c), or (d) may be made
only by a trustee or DIP. 167 Credit may be obtained pursuant to
cushion sufficient adequate protection for primed security lender).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(2). See also KS Invs. v. T.M. Sweeney & Sons LTL
Servs., Inc. (In re T.M. Sweeney & Sons LTL Servs., Inc.), 131 B.R. 984, 990-91
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding the burden was not excused by the prior
lienholder's failure to object to the financing order).
161. In re First S. Sav. Ass'n, 820 F.2d 700, 710 (5th Cir. 1987).
162. In re Snowshoe, 789 F.2d at 1090.
163. Id. at 1088-90. See also In re Dunes Casino Hotel, 69 B.R. 784, 795-96
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (authorizing the DIP to borrow $697,000, secured by a
senior lien, where the objecting bank, which alleged that it was owed
approximately $17,000,000, had a lien on collateral worth at least $26,000,000
and this substantial equity cushion provided the bank with adequate
protection, especially since no evidence had been presented that the property
was depreciating in value).
164. 137 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
165. Id. at 899-90.
166. In re Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 B.R. 177, 185 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1991).
167. See In re Temple Stephens Co., 145 B.R. 975, 977 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1992) (denying the bank's motion for an order to pay a mechanic's lien with
the payment to be secured by an additional lien in favor of the bank since only
the trustee or DIP can make a motion to borrow funds under Code § 364). Cf.
In re Hickey Props., Ltd., 181 B.R. 173, 174 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (plan which
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subsections (b), (c), and (d) of Code § 364 only with court approval
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
after notice and a hearing. 168
Procedure 4001(c), which governs the mechanics of obtaining court
authorization for credit under Code § 364, provides:
(1) Motion; Service. A motion for authority to obtain credit shall be

made in accordance with Rule 9014 and shall be served on any
committee elected pursuant to Code § 705 or appointed pursuant to
§ 1102 of Code or its authorized agent, or, if the case is a. chapter
11 reorganization case and no committee of unsecured creditors has
been appointed pursuant to Code § 1102, on the creditors included
on the list filed pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities
as the court may direct. The motion shall be accompanied by a copy
of the agreement.
(2) Hearing. The court may commence a final hearing on a motion
for authority to obtain credit no earlier than 15 days after service of
the motion. If the motion so requests, the court may conduct a
hearing before such 15-day period expires, but the court may
authorize the obtaining of credit only to the extent necessary to
avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final
hearing.
(3) Notice. Notice of hearing pursuant to this subdivision shall be
given to the parties on whom service of the motion is required by
paragraph (1) of this subdivision and to such other entities as the
court may direct.
A motion to obtain credit under Code § 364 should include the
amount and type of credit to be extended, the lender's name and
address, the terms of any agreement, the need to obtain the credit,
and the efforts made to obtain credit from other sources. If the
motion is
made pursuant to Code § 364(c)(2) or (3)
or
Code § 364(d), the motion must describe the collateral and the
169
protection to be given to existing interests in the collateral.
Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b),
motions, including motions to obtain credit, may be served by mail,
and service is complete upon mailing. Although Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(f) adds three days to the notice
periods for many motions served by mail, it does not extend the
170
fifteen-day period prescribed in Rule 4001(c)(2).
The court may not schedule a final hearing on a motion for
authority to obtain credit earlier than fifteen days after service of
the motion. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(c)(2),

depended on debtor's ability to obtain post-confirmation financing by granting
superpriority lien could not be confirmed because it was not feasible, since
there is no authority in the Code for creation of such a lien).
168. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c).
169. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001 (advisory committee's note).
170. See Id.
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however, permits the court to hold a preliminary hearing before
the expiration of the fifteen-day period, provided that the court
may authorize the obtaining of credit only to the extent necessary
to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a
Rule 4001(c)(3) requires that notice of the
final hearing.
preliminary hearing be given to all parties entitled to notice of the
final hearing. The language of Rule 4001(c) has been construed to
171
prohibit ex parte relief.
Rule 4001(c) does not specify the type or method of notice
which must be given for a preliminary hearing. The facts and
circumstances of each particular case will dictate the notice which
must be given. 172 An agreement regarding the obtaining of credit
may be approved by the filing and service of a motion pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 4001(d).
Unless an order under Code § 364 is stayed, the approved
credit may be extended immediately, whether or not an appeal is
filed. 173 If the entity extending credit did so in good faith, the
reversal or modification on appeal of an order authorizing the
credit does not affect the validity of the extension of credit or liens
accorded the lender unless the appellant obtained a stay pending
appeal. 74 The term "good faith" is not mere surplusage, and
involves more than the absence of a misrepresentation to the
bankruptcy court. 75 The "good faith rule" will not prevent the
reversal of an order authorizing the extension of credit,
notwithstanding the failure to obtain a stay of that order, where
171. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4001.07[4], at 4001-37 (15th ed. 1994).
172. See Center Enters., Inc. v. Center Wholesale, Inc. (In re Center
Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding notice received
one day before Code § 364(d) hearing is insufficient); In re Allegheny, 131 B.R.
at 30 (notice and hearing requirements relating to the payment of a loan
commitment fee were satisfied by a hearing and a post-hearing opportunity to
submit statements on a motion to pay the bank and its attorneys their
expenses); In re FCX, 54 B.R. at 839 (four-day telephone and mail notice to
thirty largest creditors sufficient for Code 364(c)(1) financing); In re Roblin
Indus., Inc., 52 B.R. 241, 242 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (telephone notice to
twenty largest unsecured creditors sufficient for interim financing).
173. Cf. In re First South Sav. Ass'n, 820 F.2d at 709; Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco, Inc.), 92 B.R. 38, 45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e). See Mobile Oil Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
(In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil), 834 F.2d 599, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1987); Adams
Apple Inc. v. Central Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484,
1489-90 (9th Cir. 1987); Clinton St. Food Corp. v. Gen. Trading (In re Clinton
St. Food Corp.), 170 B.R. 216, 220-21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bank of New
England v. BWL, Inc., 121 B.R. 413, 417 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990); Butler Paper
Co. v. Graphic Arts Lithographers, Inc. (In re Graphic Arts Lithographers,
Inc.), 71 B.R. 774, 777 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8005
(governing motions for a stay pending appeal).
175. In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1982). See also N.Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 901 F.2d 1359, 1366
(6th Cir. 1990).
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the order was granted without notice. Such an order is void
because it is a violation of the constitutional right of procedural
176
due process.
The failure to obtain a stay pending appeal may result in the
appeal being dismissed as moot. In In re Swedeland Development
Group, Inc., the Third Circuit rejected the argument that an
appeal of a Code § 364 order must automatically be dismissed if a
stay of that order is not obtained. 17 7 Rather, the court held that,
under the mootness doctrine, the appeal should be dismissed only
if the appellate court can not grant any effective relief.178 Because
the loan had not been completely drawn down, the appeal was not
moot

1 79

C. Effect of Conversion
Credit extended during the course of a chapter 11 case
constitutes an expense of administration of that case. When a
chapter 11 case is converted to a chapter 7 case, Code § 726(b)
accords post-conversion chapter 7 administrative expenses priority
over the pre-conversion expenses under Code § 364(a) and (b).180
It would appear that the phrase "with priority over any or all
administrative expenses of the kind specified in section 503(b) or
507(b)" contained in Code § 364(c)(1) results in the credit extended
thereunder overriding the provision of Code § 726(b).181 Because
of this potential result, as a practical matter, the courts typically
require that a carve out from the Code § 364 (c)(1) priority be
made for at least the professional expenses of an ensuing chapter 7
case.
VIII. SECTION 1111(b)
A. Introduction
Section 1111 (b) of the Code affords unique rights to the holder
of an undercollateralized secured claim. Its subsection (b)(1),
under certain conditions, grants the right of recourse to a creditor
whose claim is without recourse under applicable nonbankruptcy
law.
Subject to two restrictions, § 1111(b)(2) permits an
176. In re Blumer, 66 B.R. at 114.
177. 16 F.3d at 559.
178. Id. at 558-60, 562-63.
179. Id. But see In re Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 606-07 (holding appeal of a Code
§ 364 order must automatically be dismissed if order was not stayed pending
appeal).
180. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 364.02, at 364-66 (15th ed. 1994); In
re Blanton-Smith Corp., 44 B.R. 73, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 81 B.R. 440 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987).
181. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
507.05, at 45 (15th ed. 1994). But see
In re Summit Ventures, Inc., 135 B.R. 478, 483 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).
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undersecured creditor to avoid having its claim treated under
subsection (b)(1) and to elect to continue to have its entire claim
treated as secured. 182 This Article discusses the development of
§ 1111(b) and analyzes its provisions.
Section 1111(b) provides:

(1)
(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be
allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if
the holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on
account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such
recourse, unless(i) the class of which such claim is a part elects, by at least
two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of allowed
claims of such claims of such class, application of paragraph
(2) of this subsection; or
(ii) such holder does not have such recourse and such property
is sold under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the
plan.
(B) A class of claims may not elect application of paragraph (2) of
this subsection if(i) the interest on account of such claims of the holders of such
claims in such property is of inconsequential value; or
(ii) the holder of a claim of such class has recourse against the
debtor on account of such claim and such property is sold
under section 363 of this title or is to be sold under the plan.
(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a)
of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such
claim is allowed.
B. Background: Section 1111(b) Overturns Pine Gate
Section 1111(b) was enacted to overturn the decision rendered
in In re Pine Gate Associates, Ltd.183 In Pine Gate, the debtor was
a limited partnership owning a single parcel of improved real
18 4
estate that was subject to pari-passu nonrecourse mortgages.
Upon encountering financial difficulty, Pine Gate filed a case
85
under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act.1
Among the provisions of Chapter XII was a cram down power

182. 11 U.S.C. § llll(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
183. No. B75-4345A, 1976 LEXIS 17366 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1976).

184. Id. at *3.
185. Id.
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in the form of appraisal and payment in cash of the value of the
collateral. 186
In Pine Gate, the mortgagees' claims totaled
$1,454,000.
The value of the property was appraised at
$1,000,000.187 The court confirmed a plan which permitted the
debtor to retain ownership of the property by paying the appraised
value in cash. 188
The long-term lending community was disturbed by the
decision because the absence of a public sale precluded mortgagees
from bidding in their liens, while the nonrecourse feature of their
notes barred them from asserting general unsecured claims for
their deficiencies. In response to these concerns, the Code does not
authorize appraisal and payment in cash as a form of cram down
and § 1111(b) was added to prevent the Pine Gate result and to
compensate to some degree the lender's loss of its right to foreclose
and retain the property for its own account.
The provisions of § 1111(b) apply only in chapter 9 and
chapter 11 cases and encompass claims secured by a lien on
property of the estate. 189
Although most cases interpreting
§ 1111(b) involve claims secured by real property, the section also
applies to claims secured by personal property and fixtures. 190
Regardless of the terms of the contract or applicable
nonbankruptcy law, § 1111(b)(1)(A), in conjunction with § 506(a),
grants an undercollateralized nonrecourse creditor a secured claim
equal to the value of its collateral and an unsecured claim for the
deficiency. 191 By way of example, under § 1111(b)(1), a nonrecourse
mortgagee whose allowed $1,000,000 claim is secured by real
property ("Blackacre") having a value of $800,000 has a secured
claim of $800,000 and an unsecured deficiency claim of $200,000.
1. Restrictionson the Applicability of§ 1111(b)(1)
Section 1111(b)(1) does not apply if the property subject to the
nonrecourse claim is sold pursuant to Code § 363 or the property is
to be sold under a plan and the secured creditor is afforded the
opportunity to credit bid the full amount of its claim. 92 Under
those circumstances, the creditor has received its prepetition
186. Id. at *5, *6 nn.4-6, *19 n.16.
187. Id. at *58.
188. Id. at *60.
189. 11 U.S.C §§ 103(f), 901.
190. In re Tuma, 916 F.2d 488, 489 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Griffiths, 27 B.R.
873, 875 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
191. See, e.g., 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs. v. The Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. in
Rehab. (In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 29 F.3d 95, 97 (2d. Cir. 1994); In re
Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R. 961, 969 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
192. As noted in Part VI infra, § 1111(b)(1) is also inapplicable if the
nonrecourse creditor makes the 1111(b)(2) election. See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone), 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th
Cir. 1991).
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193

contractual bargain.
In In re DRW Property Co. 82,194 a nonrecourse mortgagee
sought to "split" its claim under § 1111(b)(1) on the ground that
foreclosure of the mortgage was not equivalent to a sale under
195
Under the plan, the debtor proposed to
§ 363 or under a plan.
abandon the collateral and permit foreclosure, thereby denying the
96
The court overruled the
creditor an unsecured claim.'
the abandonment of
that
mortgagee's objection, reasoning
collateral to the mortgagee or foreclosure sale conducted following
the vacation of the automatic stay has the same effect as a sale
under § 363(k).1 97 The court concluded that the lack of an express
reference to abandonment and foreclosure sales as exceptions to
98
In summary, the
§ 1111(b) was an unintentional omission.
proposes to
debtor
the
if
provisions of § 1111(b)(1) will be triggered
the sale of
where
or
retain ownership of the mortgaged property,
secured
the
bars
that
the property is conducted in a manner
claim.
its
of
creditor from bidding in the full amount
Separate Classificationof § 1111(b)(1) Deficiency Claim
There is a significant split in the case law regarding the
propriety of separately classifying the unsecured deficiency claim
statutorily created by § 1111(b)(1) from other general unsecured
claims. A minority of courts have found that such separate
classification is not only permissible but mandatory. They regard
the § 1111(b) unsecured deficiency claim as different from other
general unsecured claims because it arises by operation of law only
199
in chapter 9 and chapter 11 cases.
2.

193. See H&M Parmely Farms v. Farmers Home Admin., 127 B.R. 644, 648
(D. S.D. 1990) (when chapter 11 plan provides for liquidation of collateral,
creditor must be notified of sale of collateral pursuant to 363(k) and allowed to

bid the full amount of its claim); Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cal.
Hancock, Inc. (In re Cal. Hancock, Inc.), 88 B.R. 226, 230-31 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1988) (debtor's plan could not be confirmed when creditor, entitled to
§ 1111(b)(1) split, was not permitted to credit bid); In re Kent Terminal Corp.,
166 B.R. 555, 566-67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (creditor has unconditional right

to bid
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

its lien if plan proposes sale of collateral free and clear of liens).
57 B.R. 987 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 993. See Tampa Bay Assocs., Ltd. v. DRW Worthington, Ltd (In

re Tampa Bay Assocs.), 864 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming reasoning of

DRW in connected case). See also Nat'l Real Estate Ltd. P'ship - II (In re Nat'l
Real Estate Ltd. P'ship - II), 104 B.R. 968, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989)
(undersecured

nonrecourse

lender

that foreclosed

upon

collateral

and

purchased it at sheriffs sale received the benefit of its bargain, is not a
recourse claimant under § 1111(b)(1), and does not hold an unsecured
deficiency claim against the debtor).
199. See, e.g., In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1994); In re
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The majority rule is that § 1111(b)(1) deficiency claims are not
inherently different from other unsecured claims and, absent valid
business reasons, do not allow separate classification. The Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have refused to permit
separate classification, particularly where gerrymandering to
satisfy the requirement of § 1129(a)(10) of the Code is obvious. 20 0
C. Section 1111(b)(2) and Electing to
Remain a Fully Secured Creditor
Section 1111(b)(2) permits an undersecured creditor to
continue to be treated as a fully secured creditor under a plan that
provides for the debtor's retention of the collateral. For example,
using the Blackacre illustration set forth above, the mortgagee
could waive the automatic "split" of its claim under § 1111(b)(1),
and remain a secured creditor with an allowed secured claim of
$1,000,000.201 The election is advantageous in those situations
where a creditor does not wish to incur an immediate loss, and
believes that its collateral will increase in value with the passage
of time. The effect of making the § 1111(b)(2) election was well
summarized in In re Weinstein:20 2
When an undersecured creditor makes the § 1111(b)(2) election, its
SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 214 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). See also In re Gato
Realty Trust Corp., 183 B.R. 15, 20-22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (separate
classification is permissible, but not mandatory).
200. In order to invoke the cram down power of § 1129(b), all of the
standards of § 1129(a) must be satisfied, except the requirement of
§ 1129(a)(8) that each impaired class accept the plan. Section 1129(a)(10)
requires that if a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class
of impaired claims must have accepted the plan, without counting the
acceptance of an insider. See, e.g., Boston Post Rd. Ltd. P'Ship v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. P'ship), 21 F.3d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994)
(separate classification of unsecured deficiency claim solely to create an
impaired assenting class to effectuate cram down is impermissible); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 161
(3d Cir. 1993) (classification method designed solely to affect the outcome of
the voting in a "cram down" situation is improper); Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd.
P'ship v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York (In re Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd.
P'ship), 968 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1992) (under proposed plan, unsecured
portion of undersecured creditor's claim could not be classified separately from
claims of unsecured trade creditors based solely on fact that undersecured
creditor's claim arose by operation of law under § 1111(b)); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th
Cir.) (court rejected debtor's argument that statutory, rather than contractual,
basis for creditor's unsecured claim warranted separate classification); In re
Greystone, 948 F.2d at 140 (distinction between § 1111(b) unsecured deficiency
claims and other unsecured claims does not warrant separate classification).
201. See Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1994); Liona Corp.,
Inc. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 949 F.2d 585, 604-05 (2d. Cir. 1991).
202. First Bank of Cal. v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284 (9th Cir.
B.A.P. 1998).
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claim is not altered by §§ 506(a) and (d). By making the election,
the creditor foregoes its unsecured, deficiency claim. Instead, its
total claim is treated as the allowed secured claim for purposes of
the Chapter 11 plan confirmation process. Nevertheless, because of
the Code's artful language, an electing creditor's allowed secured
claim is not treated the same as a fully secured claim. Rather, the
§ 1111(b)(2) election can be understood as giving rise to an "election
special treatment for
claim" equal to the total claim but allotted
20 3
purposes of the plan confirmation process.

Section 1111(b)(2) can be viewed as a classification provision
under which the undercollateralized secured creditor can create its
own class. The purpose of the § 1111(b)(2) election is to avoid an
undersecured claim automatically being split into secured and
the creditor of the potential
unsecured portions, thereby depriving
20 4
asset.
the
of
value
in
for appreciation
A creditor making the § 1111(b)(2) election should request
that the restructured note and lien documents contain a "due-onsale clause" providing for accelerated payment of the claim if the
collateral is subsequently sold. The right to include a due-on-sale
clause in the restructured agreement is enhanced if such a clause
20 5
It also can be
was contained in the original note and mortgage.
provision intended
argued that a due-on-sale clause is a customary 206
lenders.
institutional
of
to promote the liquidity
The right of the undersecured creditor to make the
§ 1111(b)(2) election is subject to two exceptions. The first is
where the creditor's interest in the collateral is of inconsequential
value. 207 In In re Baxley, 20 the court found that an interest valued
at eight percent of the creditor's total claim is of consequential
value and stated, in dictum, that an interest is of inconsequential
20 9
Disagreeing with Baxley, the court
value only if it is of no value.

203. Id. at 293.
204. In re Elijah, 41 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984). See also In re
Tuma, 916 F.2d at 491 (purpose of § 1111(b)(2) is to give the creditor the
benefit of collateral's appreciation); Etchin v. Star Servs., Inc. (In re Etchin),
128 B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (pursuant to § 1111(b)(2), "the
creditor and not the debtor may receive the benefit of any appreciation of the
collateral up to the full amount of the lien ... even if the value at the time of
the reorganization is substantially less").
205. IPC Atlanta Ltd. P'ship v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re. IPC
Atlanta Ltd. P'ship), 163 B.R. 396, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
206. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
145-46 (1982); Bleecker Assocs. v. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 544 F.
Supp. 794, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2)(i). See, e.g., In re Union Meeting Partners, 178
B.R. 664, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
208. 72 B.R. 195 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1986).
209. Id. at 198. See also In re Tuma, 916 F.2d at 491 ("present control of a
functioning corporation" is more than inconsequential value; court does not
have to determine exact value, as long as it determines that value is not
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in In re Wandler2 10 held than an interest valued at approximately
four percent of the creditor's total claim was of inconsequential
value, thereby precluding the creditor from making the
§ 1111(b)(2) election. 211
The second exception, which mirrors Code § 1111(b)(1)(A)(ii),
is where the creditor has a recourse claim and the property is sold
under § 363, or the property is to be sold under the plan of
reorganization and the creditor is afforded the opportunity to bid
in the full amount of its claim. 212 Here again, the creditor is
realizing its entire contractual bargain, i.e., the right to bid for the
property and to file a general unsecured claim for any
deficiency.213
The § 1111(b)(2) election is made by the affirmative vote of
two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of the allowed
claims of the class of which the claim is a part. 2 14 While the voting
requirement contained in § 1126(c) of the Code for an accepting
class of impaired claims may have been intended, the text of
§ 1111(b)(1) refers to the entire class and not only to those that
have voted to accept or reject the plan. This is likely of limited
significance because the class making the § 1111(b)(2) election
often consists of a single secured creditor.
The election may be made at any time prior to the conclusion
of the hearing on the disclosure statement or within such later
time as the court may fix.

215

The election must be in writing and

signed, unless made at the disclosure statement hearing. 216 The
election is binding on all members of the class with respect to the
plan.

217

The § 1111(b)(2) election may not be withdrawn unless a
proposed modification to the plan is subjectively and materially
adverse to the electing creditor to the extent that would lead a
hypothetical reasonable investor to reconsider its election. 218 In re
inconsequential).
210. 77 B.R. 728 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987).
211. Id. at 733.
212. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii).
213. In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 983, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
See also In re Cal. Hancock, 88 B.R. at 230 (where creditor had a pre-petition
nonrecourse claim and debtor's plan proposed to sell the collateral and deny
the creditor the opportunity to "credit bid," the plan vitiated the creditor's
§ 1111(b) rights).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A)(i).
215. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3014. See In re Rosage, 82 B.R. 389, 389 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Century Glove, Inc., 74 B.R. 958, 961 (Bankr. D. Del.
1987).
216. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3014. See H&MParmely Farms, 127 B.R. at 647 (D.
S.D. 1990) (debtor given adequate notice of 1111(b) election by oral election at
confirmation hearing).
217. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3014.

218. Bloomingdale Partners,155 B.R. at 971.
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RBS Industries, Inc. 219 held the election under § 1111(b) not
binding when made to a prior plan substantially different from the
220
current plan.
D. Section 1111(b) and Confirmation
Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan requires satisfaction of the
best interests test contained in § 1129(a)(7). A separate test exists
for a creditor making the § 1111(b)(2) election. The test contained
in § 1129(a)(7)(B) requires that the electing creditor only receive
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not
less than the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest
221
In substance, the test
in the property that secures such claims.
eliminates from the best interest calculation the dividend that
unsecured claim if the § 1111(b)(2) election
would be paid on the
222
made.
had not been
The right to cram down a plan over the rejection of a class
making the § 1111(b)(2) election will be governed either by
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) or § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code. Subsection (i)
permits cram down where payment of the total claim is secured by
the collateral and the present value of deferred cash payments
received on account of that claim is equal to the value of the
223
Under the prior illustration,
creditor's interest in the collateral.
if the creditor received
satisfied
be
the cram down provision would
payment of which
$1,000,000,
of
a note in the principal amount
value of the note
present
the
as
was secured by Blackacre, so long
$800,000.
on the effective date of the plan was
Section 1111(b) of the Code affords an undersecured creditor
unique rights where ownership of the creditor's collateral is
retained by the reorganized debtor or a successor entity, i.e., the
collateral is not exposed to sale. Whether or not the claim is a
recourse claim, the unsecured creditor entitled to the benefits of
§ 1111(b)(1) will receive an unsecured claim for the amount of its
deficiency. Alternatively, the creditor may forego the unsecured
claim and elect under § 1111(b)(2) to remain a secured creditor for
the full amount of its allowed claim.

219. 115 B.R. 419 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
220. Id. at 421.
221. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7)(B).
222. See Weinstein, 227 B.R. at 293-94.
223. See In re Cook, 126 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1991) (plan cannot be
confirmed unless creditor electing 1111(b) treatment receives full payment of
allowed secured claim); In re Kvamme, 93 B.R. 698, 699 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1988).
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IX. PLAN CONFIRMATION
A. Classificationof Secured Claims
Each secured claim is a separate class for purposes of a
chapter 11 plan. A first lien on Blackacre is a separate class from
the second lien on Blackacre. A creditor having a first lien on
Blackacre and a first lien on Whiteacre both owned by the debtor
has two separate secured claims. The simplest way of dealing
with any claim, whether secured or unsecured, is not to impair it.
If the mortgage bears a below market rate of interest, the plan
should reinstate the mortgage according to its terms under
§ 1124(1). If this is done, the secured claim is unimpaired and the
claimant is deemed to have accepted the plan.
B. Confirmation Hearingand Requirements
for Consensual Confirmation
Code § 1129, in conjunction with Code § 1128(a), requires the
court to make an independent assessment of the plan's compliance
with the statutory requirements even where each impaired class
has accepted the plan and no objection has been raised. 224 Any
party in interest may appear at that hearing and object to
confirmation.225 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(b),
2002(d), 2002(f), 3017(c), 3017(d), 3020, and 9014 establish
confirmation hearing procedures with respect to, inter alia, notices
and the filing of objections.
Section 1129(a) specifies the 13 requirements for the
confirmation of a plan that has been accepted by all impaired
classes. The plan proponent carries the burden of satisfying each
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. 226
The
requirements are discussed below.
1.

Compliance with Title 11
The plan must comply with "the applicable provisions of this

224. Williams v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank (In re Williams), 850 F.2d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1988).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b). Wallis v. Justice Oaks II, Ltd. (In re Justice Oaks
II, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544, 1551 (11th Cir.) (holding that guarantor of debtor's
loan is a party in interest for purposes of objecting to confirmation); In re Cent.
Med. Ctr., Inc., 122 B.R. 568, 570-571 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (ruling that
debtor and bondholders' committee may object to creditor's plan even where
bondholders have accepted the plan). But see In re Cheatham, 78 B.R. 104,
106 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that administrative claimant whose claim
must be paid in full on plan's effective date has no standing to object to
confirmation).
226. Heartland Fed. Sav. Ass'n Enters. v. Briscoe Enters. Ltd. II, 994 F.2d
1160, 1163 (5th Cir. 1993).
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title [title 11]. '"227 By substituting "title" 'for "chapter" in Code
§ 1129(a)(1) in 1984, Congress clarified its intention that a plan
comply with all of the substantive provisions of the Code, and not
only those contained in chapter 11.
The proponent of the plan must comply with the applicable
The legislative history of Code
provisions of the Code. 228
§ 1129(a)(2) suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with
ensuring that the proponent of the plan provide "adequate
information" to those entities voting on the plan, as required by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3017(d)
Code § 1125.
provides that a bankruptcy court may excuse a plan proponent
from transmitting the disclosure statement to members of
unimpaired, non-voting classes.
2. Good FaithProposalof the Plan and Payment Disclosure
The plan must have been proposed in good faith and not by
any means forbidden by law. 229 Although the Code does not define
"good faith," a plan generally is considered to be proposed in good
faith "if there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve
a result consistent with the standards prescribed under the Code."
The plan must disclose any payments made or to be made by the
proponent, by the debtor, or by any person issuing securities or
acquiring property under the plan, for services or for costs and
230
Any such
expenses in connection with the plan and the case.
or
reasonable,
as
by the court
payment must have been approved
231
approval.
such
to
be subject
The proponent of the plan must disclose two things. First, the
identity and affiliation of each individual who will serve as a
director, officer, or voting trustee of the reorganized debtor, or of
any affiliate participating in a plan with the debtor, or of any
successor to the debtor. 232 Second, the plan must disclose the
233
If the
nature of any compensation to be paid to any insider.
of a
jurisdiction
the
to
subject
are
debtor's rates for its services
in
provided
change
rate
any
governmental regulatory commission,
or
commission
such
by
approved
the plan must have been
234
approval.
commission's
such
upon
conditioned
3.

The "BestInterests" Test
The "best interests" test of Code § 1129(a)(7) requires that all

227. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1).
228. Id. § 1129(a)(2).

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. § 1129(a)(3).
Id. § 1129(a)(4).
Id.
Id. § 1129(a)(5)(A)(i)(ii).
Id.
Id. § 1129(a)(6).
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impaired creditors and interest holders fare at least as well under
the plan as they would in a chapter 7 liquidation.
More
specifically, Code § 1129(a)(7) requires that each member of an
impaired class receive or retain under the plan property of a value,
as of the effective date of the plan, at least equal to that which the
member would receive or retain in a chapter 7 liquidation, unless
the class unanimously accepts the plan.235 If Code § 1l11(b)(2) is
applicable to an impaired class of claims, each holder of a claim in
that class must only receive or retain property having a value, as
of the effective date, at least equal to the value of such holder's
23
secured claim. 6
Other than in a cram down situation under Code § 1129(b),
the court may not confirm a plan unless every impaired class of
claims or interests accepts the plan.237 Acceptance of the plan by a
class of claims requires the affirmative vote of not less than twothirds in amount and a majority in number of the allowed claims
of creditors in that class that actually vote. 238 Acceptance of the
plan by a class of impaired interests requires the affirmative vote
of two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests of the class that
actually vote. 23 9 A class that is not impaired is conclusively
presumed to have accepted the plan.240 A class that does not
receive or retain any property under the plan is deemed to have
rejected the plan. 241 When a deemed rejection occurs, the plan
may only be confirmed under the cram down power of Code
§ 1129(b).242
4.

Treatment of Administrative and Priority Claims

Priority claims arising under Code § 507(a)(1) (administrative
expenses, court costs, and compensation of professionals) or
Code § 507(a)(2) (gap period claims) must be paid in full on the
effective date of the plan. 243
Wage and consumer priority
creditors, if their classes accept the plan, may be paid over a
period of time, provided that the deferred payments have a present
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed
amount of their claims. 244 Any administrative or priority creditor
may agree to less favorable treatment than that provided by
Code § 1129(a)(9).

235. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A).
236. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(B); In re Weinstein, 227 B.R. at 293-94.
237. Id. § 1129(a)(8).

238. Id. § 1126(c).
239. Id. § 1126(d).
240. Id. § 1126(f).

241. Id. § 1126(g).
242. Id. § 1129(b).
243. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
244. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B).
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Certain unsecured tax obligations (i.e., those entitled to
priority pursuant to Code § 507(a)(8)) may be paid over a period
not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such taxes
if the taxing authority receives deferred cash payments of a value,
as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of
its claim. 245 Secured tax obligations, such as real property taxes
are subject to the cram down, but are not subject to § 1129(a)(9).
5. Affirmative Acceptance by an Impaired Class of Claims and the
Plan'sFeasibility
If any class of claims is impaired by a plan, at least one such
class must accept the plan, without counting the acceptances of
insiders. 246 A plan, however, may not manufacture impaired
classes merely for the purpose of garnering votes of such classes in
favor of the plan. 247 Courts have condemned modifications to
contractual rights which only slightly impair a creditor's position
for no justifiable reason as being artificial impairment or a mere
248
artifice.
The plan must be "feasible," i.e., the court must determine
that the debtor, or its successor under a plan, is not likely to
require further financial reorganization or liquidation unless
contemplated by the plan. 249 The purpose of the feasibility
requirement is to prevent confirmation of a visionary scheme that
promises more than the debtor possibly can achieve. 250 The plan
need only offer a reasonable assurance of success, not a
In evaluating the likelihood of a successful
guarantee. 251
reorganization, "[p]ertinent factors to be considered include the
business' earning power, the sufficiency of the capital structure,
the same
economic conditions, managerial efficiency, and whether
252
management will continue to operate the company."
6. Bankruptcy Fees and Retiree Benefits
All bankruptcy case administration fees payable under 28
U.S.C. § 1930, including U.S. Trustee's fees, must be paid by or on
253
the effective date of a plan.

245. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
246. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
247. Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Unum Life Ins. Co. (In re
Williams Convalescent Ctrs., Ltd. P'ship), 151 B.R. 220, 222 (D. Minn. 1991).
248. Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re
Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1993).
249. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
250. In re Gulph Woods Corp., 84 B.R. 961, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
251. Heartland, 994 F.2d at 1163.
252. In re Georgetown Ltd. P'ship., 209 B.R. 763, 801-02 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1997).
253. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(12).
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Code § 1129(a)(13) was added to the Code by the Retiree
Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 It requires that a plan
provide for the continued post-confirmation payment of all "retiree
benefits" as defined in Code § 1114 for the duration of the period
for which the debtor is obligated to make such payments, at the
level
established
prior
to
confirmation
pursuant
to
Code § 1114(e)(1)(B) or Code § 1114(g). 254 Sections 1114(e)(1)(B)
and 1114(g) permit the trustee or debtor in possession to modify
pre-chapter 11 retiree benefits by agreement with the authorized
representative of the retiree benefit recipients (§ 11 14(e)(1)(B)) or,
255
under certain circumstances, by court order (§ 1114(g)).
C. Cram Down-Non Consensual Confirmation
If all of the requirements for confirmation of Code § 1129(a)
have been met, except that of Code § 1129(a)(8) requiring the
acceptance of each impaired class, the plan proponent may request
confirmation of the plan pursuant to Code § 1129(b), commonly
known as the cram down power. Conditions precedent to the
invocation of Code § 1129(b) are that the plan (1) does not
discriminate unfairly, and (2) is fair and equitable with respect to
each rejecting class. 256
In light of Code § 1126's express
requirement that creditors affirmatively accept a plan, the Ruti25 7
Sweetwater holding must be questioned.
1. Reorganization Value
In a nonconsensual setting it is necessary to determine the
value of the reorganized entity in order to determine which classes
of claims or interests may receive or retain value under the plan,
i.e., which classes are "in the money." Once the valuation is
performed, the proponents can apply the absolute priority rule of
Code § 1129(b) that no junior class may participate in the plan
unless rejecting senior classes have received full compensation,
provided that no class may be paid more than in full. 258
Determining reorganization value is an art and not a science. As

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 1129(b)(1).

See Johns-Manville, 843 F.2d at 650.

Cf. In re Ruti-

Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that, for purposes of
cram down, an impaired class consisting of one non-voting, non-objecting
creditor is deemed to have accepted the plan, stating that "to hold otherwise
would be to endorse the proposition that a creditor may sit idly by, not
participate in any manner in the formulation and adoption of a plan of
reorganization and thereafter, subsequent to the adoption of the plan, raise a
challenge to the plan for the first time").
257. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) and 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy (MB)
1129.03[8] n.125 (15th ed. Rev. 1997).
258. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 414 (1977).
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observed by one commentator: "It is a guess compounded by an
259
estimate."
It has been recognized that courts should use a "conservative"
or "meticulous regard" standard of valuation to protect senior
creditors' interests and not apply a "liberal" valuation standard
that might allow junior creditors or equity interests to participate
260
at the expense of senior creditors or the feasibility of the plan.
Similarly, that valuation should occur and be based on facts
existing at the time of confirmation, and may be substantially
different from a similar valuation made earlier in the chapter 11
261
case for purposes of adequate protection.
2. The Fairand Equitable Test
For a plan to be considered fair and equitable, it must comply
with the absolute priority rule with respect to all rejecting classes
of claims and interests. 262 The absolute priority rule, as modified
by the Code, prohibits a junior class from receiving or retaining
any property on account of its claims or interests over the rejection
of the plan by a senior class not being paid in full. The converse of
the absolute priority rule is that no senior class of claims or
interests may receive a premium.
Importantly, however, compliance with the absolute priority
rule does not assure that a plan is fair and equitable. Code
§ 1129(b)(2)'s use of the word "includes" requires compliance with
other fair and equitable tests, e.g., the allocation of voting
power. 263 Rather, "a court must consider the entire plan in the
context of the rights of the creditors under state law and the
particular facts and circumstances when determining whether a
264
plan is 'fair and equitable."'
3. Cram Down of Secured Claims
Although focusing upon chapter 11, the discussion of the cram
down power is applicable to chapter 9, 12 and 13 cases. Chapter 9
adopts § 1129(b)(2)(A). The substantive provision of the cram
down power of § 1129(b)(2)(A) and § 1325(a)(5) are the same and
have been interpreted that way. 265 The text of § 1225(a)(5) is

259. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MD) 1 1129.06[2]; Peter V. Pantaleo &
Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAW. 419 (1996).
260. See In re Evans Prods. Co., 65 B.R. 870, 876 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
261. See Ahlers v. Norwest Bank Worthington, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
262. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
263. In re D&F Constr., 865 F.2d at 675.
264. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) which defines "includes" and "including"
as not limiting.
265. See Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 102 F.3d
874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).
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identical to that of § 1325(a)(5). The chapter 11 cram down power
has three prongs.
Under subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), where
property is being retained by the reorganized debtor or transferred
pursuant to the plan, there are two prerequisites to the invocation
of the cram down power. The first is that the property be valued
at its replacement value as compared to foreclosure value. This
issue was resolved by the Supreme Court in 1997 in Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash.266 The second condition is the fixing of
an interest rate with respect to deferred payments that provide
the secured creditor with the present value of the allowed secured
claim as of the effective date of the plan. Till v. SCS Credit
Corp.,267 a five-to-four decision rendered by the Supreme Court in
2004, held that the applicable rate of interest was the "formula
rate," the national prime rate in effect as of confirmation to which
a risk adjustment factor is to be added. The Supreme Court did
not analyze the risk adjustment factor but did note that it usually
ranges from one to three percent.
The second cram down alternative is to sell the property free
and clear of the secured creditor's lien, subject to the creditor's
right to credit bid under Code § 363(k), with the lien attaching to
the proceeds of sale, and the value of the being treated either
under Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (above) or Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)
(below) .268
The third alternative is that the secured creditor receives the
"indubitable equivalent" of its claim. 269 This is the same concept
contained in Code § 361(3) with respect to the law of adequate
protection, its origin being the decision in In re Murel Holding
Co. 270 For example, adequately securing payment of the debt with
United States Treasury Notes would be deemed an indubitable
equivalent.
But deferring payment only makes sense if the
Treasury Notes have a higher interest rate than that accruing on
the secured claim.
4. Absolute Priorityand "New Value"
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 271 the Supreme
Court created what has become commonly known as the "new
value exception" to the absolute priority rule. 272 In Los Angeles
Lumber, the Court considered whether a plan of reorganization

266. 520 U.S. 953, 960-62 (1997).
267. 541 U.S. 465 (2004).

268. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
269. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
270. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). See Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States
(In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1996); In re James
Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992).
271. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
272. Id. at 121-22.
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permitting shareholders to retain an interest in the reorganized
debtor without requiring a fresh contribution of capital and which
plan did not pay creditors in full was "fair and equitable. '273 The
Court held that the plan violated the absolute priority rule but
proceeded to discuss the circumstances under which prepetition
equity holders might participate in a plan of reorganization where
unsecured creditors were not paid in full.274 The Court stated that
participation by prepetition owners would not violate the absolute
priority rule if they made a fresh contribution: (1) in money or
money's worth; (2) that was reasonably equivalent to the
participation accorded them; and (3) that was necessary for a
275
feasible reorganization.
Although the Code's cram down power incorporated the
absolute priority rule of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, neither
the statute nor the legislative history indicated whether "the new
value exception" continued to exist. The issue arose but was not
decided in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers.276 The debtors,
who were farmers, proposed a chapter 11 plan permitting them to
retain the equity interest in their farm in exchange for their
agreement to continue to farm to generate the funds to pay
creditors under the plan. 277 The plan did not provide for full
payment to rejecting classes of creditors. 278 The Court held that
"sweat equity" did not constitute "money or money's worth" and,
therefore, it need not decide whether the "new value exception"
279
survived enactment of the Code.
Post Ahlers, the courts divided on the vitality of the "new
value exception." The most commonly accepted view is that the
"new value exception" survived the enactment of the Code. This
position relies on Dewsnup v. Timm, 280 in which the Supreme
Court stated that the Code did not effect any major change in preCode judicially created practice unless there was "at least some
discussion" in the legislative history of Congressional intent to
make such a change. 281 Since the Los Angeles Lumber "exception"
was clearly part of pre-Code judicially created practice and the
legislative history of the Code does not suggest its repeal, the new
value exception should be deemed to have survived enactment of
28 2
the Code.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id..
Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203 n.3.
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 410.
Id.
See In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d at 320.
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Cases holding the "new value exception" to have been
repealed by the Code include In re Drimmel.28 3 Still other courts
viewed the phrase "new value exception" as a misnomer, holding
instead that the "exception" is not an exception at all, but a
corollary to the absolute priority rule. 28 4 This third approach,
which represents current thinking, starts with the premise that, in
a cram down situation, Code § 1129(b) clearly bars prepetition
owners from retaining or receiving an interest under the plan "on
account of' their prior ownership interests. 28 5 However, when
prepetition owners infuse into the reorganized debtor necessary
new value in the form of money or money's worth, the basis of
their equity interest in the reorganized debtor is not their
prepetition ownership interest in the debtor, but rather their
payment of new value for an interest in the reorganized debtor.
Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v.
28 6
203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership
was the second case
presenting the new value issue to the Court. Through extensions
of its exclusivity period, only the debtor's equity holders were
given the option to acquire equity in the reorganized partnership
by making new value contributions. 2 7 The chapter 11 plan was
confirmed, which decision was affirmed by the district court and,
288
in a two to one decision, by the Seventh Circuit.
The tone of the Supreme Court's majority opinion suggests
the Court would find "new value" to be part of current bankruptcy
law. As in Ahlers, it decided the case on a narrow ground again
leaving for another day the viability of new value. 28 9 In the
majority's view, assuming new value principles are part of chapter
11 law, a plan providing "junior interest holders with exclusive
opportunities free from competition and without benefit of market
valuation fall within the prohibition of Code § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).290
The Court further held that: "Whether a market test would
require an opportunity to offer competing plans or would be
283. In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989). See also
Michael H. Strub, New Value Rule: Applying the Single-Asset Paradigm, 111
BANKING L.J. 228 (1994) (concluding pre-Code practice not viable); John D.
Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priorityafter Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963 (1989);
Julie L. Friedberg, Comment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 893 (1993); Salvatore G.
Gangemi & Stephen Bordanaro, Note, The New Value Exception: Square Peg
in a Round Hole, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 173 (1993).
284. In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub
nom. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 510 U.S. 1039, motion
to vacate denied and appeal dismissed as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
285. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
286. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526
U.S. 434 (1999).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 458.
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satisfied by a right to bid for the same interest sought by old
291
equity is a question we do not decide here."
It has been observed that the immediate legacy of 203 N.
LaSalle is more litigation, particularly in single asset real estate
cases to determine what activities are necessary to satisfy the
Supreme Court's "market test."
D. Competing Plansand the ProhibitionAgainst Tax
Avoidance and Violation of the Securities Act of 1933
Only one plan may be confirmed. If all of the prerequisites to
confirmation are met with respect to more than one plan, the court
must consider, but is not bound by, the preferences of creditors
292
A
and interest holders in determining which plan to confirm.
plan may not be confirmed if a party in interest that is a
governmental unit proves that the principal purpose of the plan is
the avoidance of taxes or the violation of the Securities Act of
1933.293

X. JURISDICTIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF
BANKRUPTCY CASES AND PROCEEDINGS
The United States district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
They are vested with
over cases filed under the Code. 294
concurrent jurisdiction over civil proceedings arising under the
Code, or arising in or related to a bankruptcy case. 295 The
allocation of the foregoing jurisdiction between the district court,
an Article III court, and its bankruptcy unit, an "Article r' court, is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 157. "Proceedings" include a secured
creditor's right to adequate protection, the estate's right to obtain
credit, the creditor's right to elect the treatment under § 111 l(b)(2)
These four
and the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. 296
proceedings are further defined to be "core" proceedings in which
the bankruptcy judge is authorized to enter a final order subject to
297
appeal.

291. Id.
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c); FED R. BANKR. P. 3018(c). See In re South Aiken,
Ltd., 121 B.R. 7 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (confirming competing plan providing
for immediate sale of debtor's building, instead of debtor's plan proposing to
delay a sale and market the building for up to two years); In re Turner Eng'g,
Inc., 109 B.R. 956, 961 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).
293. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d).
294. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
295. Id. § 1334(b).
296. Id. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O). See also In re Burger Boys, Inc., 183 B.R. 682,
685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that a core proceeding "is generally
defined as a matter which would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy
case").
297. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

